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ABSTRACT
How does impatience affect job search? More impatient workers search less intensively and set a
lower reservation wage. The effect on the exit rate from unemployment is unclear. In this paper we
show that, if agents have exponential time preferences, the reservation wage effect dominates for
sufficiently patient individuals, so increases in impatience lead to higher exit rates. The opposite is
true for agents with hyperbolic time preferences: more impatient workers search less and exit
unemployment later. Using two large longitudinal data sets, we find that various measures of
impatience are negatively correlated with search effort and the exit rate from unemployment, and are
orthogonal to reservation wages. Overall, impatience has a large effect on job search outcomes in
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The theory of job search is one of the cornerstones of labor economics. It characterizes the
optimal job search policy for employed and unemployed workers, and it relates it to observable
variables such as unemployment beneﬁts, the arrival rate of oﬀers, and the distribution of reem-
ployment wages (Lippman and McCall, 1976; Burdett and Ondrich, 1985). A large empirical
literature has tested the predictions of the model (Lancaster, 1979; Flinn and Heckman, 1983;
Ham and Rea, 1987).
T h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei sa ni m p o r t a n tc o m p o n e n to fd e c i s i o n st h a ti n v o l v ei n t e r t e m -
poral trade-oﬀs, such as job search choices. Yet the eﬀect of impatience on job search has
received little attention, despite a growing interest in time discounting in economics (Becker
and Mulligan, 1997; Laibson, 1997).
In this paper we address theoretically and assess empirically the eﬀects of impatience on job
search outcomes. We set up a model in which an unemployed worker chooses at every period
both the search eﬀort and the reservation wage. These two variables then determine the
transition out of unemployment.
Impatience has two contrasting eﬀects on job search. On one hand, more impatient individuals
assign a lower value to the future beneﬁts of search, and therefore exert less eﬀort: this tends
to lower the job oﬀer arrival rate and to increase the length of unemployment. On the other
hand, higher impatience acts to lower the reservation wage and to shorten the unemployment
spell: once a wage oﬀer is received, more impatient individuals prefer to accept what they
already have at hand rather than to wait an additional period for a better oﬀer. The global
eﬀect on the exit rate depends on the relative strength of these two factors.
In this paper we sign the eﬀect of impatience on the exit rate. We prove that, if individuals
diﬀer in the exponential discount rate, then for suﬃciently patient individuals the reservation
wage eﬀect is stronger than the search eﬀect. This implies that workers with higher impatience
exit unemployment faster. We complement this theoretical result with simulations showing
that the correlation of impatience and exit rates is indeed positive for plausible values of the
discount rate. The result breaks down only when individuals are so impatient that they accept
any wage oﬀer, in contrast with the substantial rejection rate in the data.
This result rests on the assumption of exponential time discounting. While the assumption
of a constant discount rate over time is standard in economics, an alternative hypothesis
has been put forward. The main ﬁnding of experiments on intertemporal preferences is that
high discounting in the short-run and low discounting in the long-run are common features
1(Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil, 1989; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995). An example by Thaler
(1981) illustrates this point: a person may prefer an apple today to two apples tomorrow;
however, we would be puzzled to ﬁnd anybody that prefers an apple in 100 days to two apples
in 101 days. In order to match this evidence on decreasing discount rates over time, we consider
the case of hyperbolic time preferences (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
In the paper we show that, if time preferences are hyperbolic, the correlation between impa-
tience and exit rate is negative, unlike in the case of exponential discounting. If individuals
diﬀer in their degree of short-run impatience, the search eﬀect dominates, and more impatient
workers stay unemployed longer. Therefore, the correlation between impatience and the exit
rate should be positive if individuals diﬀer in their exponential discount rate, but should be
negative if they are hyperbolic and they diﬀer in their short-term discount rate. This result
extends to a continuous-time model with hyperbolic discounting (Harris and Laibson, 2002).
For intuition on this result, consider the two separate decisions making up the search process.
First, the worker chooses the probability with which he will receive an oﬀer. Second, upon
receiving an oﬀer, he decides whether it is good enough. The ﬁrst decision involves a trade-oﬀ
between the present costs of searching and beneﬁts that will start to materialize in the near
future, once an oﬀer is accepted. This time span is relatively short: in the United States, the
mean duration of unemployment spells is 20 weeks. Over this limited time horizon, short-run
impatience matters the most. On the other hand, the reservation wage decision involves a
comparison of long-term consequences, once an oﬀer is received: the worker chooses whether
to accept the wage or wait for an even better oﬀer. Since immediate payoﬀsa r ee s s e n t i a l l y
not aﬀected, the worker is making a choice for the long run. Therefore, variation in long-
term discounting (as postulated by exponential preferences) matters more than variation in
short-term discounting.
In addition to predictions about the exit rate, the model provides testable predictions about
other job search outcomes. If measured impatience captures variation in the exponential
discount rate, it should be negatively correlated to search eﬀort and strongly negatively cor-
related to reservation wages and re-employment wages. If it captures variation in short-term
discounting, then it should be negatively correlated to search eﬀort and essentially orthogonal
to reservation wages and re-employment wages.
The previous discussion illustrates one of the novel features of this paper. Flinn and Heckman
(1982) have demonstrated that, using only unemployment duration and accepted wage infor-
mation, it is impossible to identify separately the time discounting parameter from the utility
ﬂow of unemployment. This identiﬁcation problem may explain the relative lack of attention
2in the literature to the eﬀects of impatience on job search. Our approach to identiﬁcation is
fundamentally diﬀerent, in that it is based on individual heterogeneity in time preferences and
observed behavior in the job search process. To be clear, this identiﬁcation strategy assumes
that we are capturing heterogeneity in time preferences and not in other variables. We show
that, in a model with endogenous search eﬀort, diﬀerent forms of heterogeneity yield diﬀerent
predictions with respect to the combined pattern of exit rates, search eﬀort and reservation
wages, hence making it possible to identify the source of variation in our results.
We test the predictions of the model using two large longitudinal data sets, the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We
proxy for impatience using a wide array of variables representing activities that involve trade-
oﬀs between immediate and delayed payoﬀs. In both data sets, the impatience measures are
negatively correlated with the exit rate, even after controlling for a large set of background
characteristics. The size of the eﬀect is large and comparable to that of human capital variables.
The eﬀect of impatience on search eﬀort is negative and sizeable, and search eﬀort appears to
be an important channel in driving variation in the exit rate. The eﬀect of impatience on reser-
vation wages and reemployment wages is essentially zero. Overall, impatience has a large eﬀect
on job search outcomes in the direction predicted by the hyperbolic discounting model. We
also consider the possibility that the impatience proxies capture alternative determinants of job
search, such as human capital level, taste for leisure, or layoﬀ probability. Taken individually,
these alternative explanations do not seem to explain the overall pattern of the results. The
combined evidence supports the view that heterogeneity in the impatience measures captures
variation in short-run impatience for individuals with hyperbolic time preferences. Of course,
given the imperfection of these proxies, we can not rule out that we are in fact capturing a
number of elements other than impatience, which, combined, generate the observed pattern of
empirical results.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. The ﬁrst contribution is to the ﬁeld of job search.
First, we uncover new theoretical implications of impatience for job search.1 We test these
implications using micro data on job search measures and proxies for impatience. Second, we
analyze a model of job search with the novel assumption of hyperbolic time preferences. The
m a i nr e s u l t si st h a th y p e r b o l i ca g e n t sd e v o t el i t t l ee ﬀort to search activities, and possibly less
than they wish. This prediction matches the anecdotal advice of job counselors2 to devote
1Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) ﬁnd that workers with higher measured impatience select jobs with
ﬂatter wage proﬁles.
2Job hunting books routinely warn against searching too little: “If two weeks have gone by and you haven’t
even started doing the inventory described in this chapter [...], don’t procrastinate any longer! Choose a helper
3more time to search, as well as the quantitative evidence that unemployed individuals report
searching on average only seven hours per week (Barron and Mellow, 1979). The test of time-
inconsistent preferences has important implications for the evaluation of welfare programs
and policies for unemployed workers. For example, time-inconsistent workers may beneﬁt
particularly from policies that commit future selves to higher search intensity. Such policies
can represent a Pareto improvement, meaning that they increase the welfare of all selves of a
hyperbolic worker (Laibson, 1997). In particular, we show that a marginal increase in search
in all periods raises the utility of all the selves, and is therefore strictly Pareto-improving.
While we do not pursue welfare evaluations in this paper, collecting empirical evidence on the
possible time inconsistency of workers is a ﬁrst, necessary step to explore such issues.
The second contribution is to the literature on hyperbolic discounting. This paper joins a
small but growing number of papers attempting to provide ﬁeld evidence on time inconsistency.
(Angeletos et al., 2001; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2003; Fang and Silverman, 2004; Gruber
and Mullainathan, 2002). The evidence in this paper supports the hyperbolic model based on
the sign of the correlation between measures of impatience and job search variables.3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the model and derive
the comparative statics of impatience on job search outcomes. In Section 3 we describe the
proxies of impatience in the NLSY and PSID data. In Section 4 we present the evidence on
the eﬀect of impatience on the exit rate from unemployment. In Section 5 we show the eﬀect
of impatience measures on search eﬀort and reservation wage. We use these results to assess
whether alternative explanations (including a simple human capital story) could rationalize
the empirical ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes. Proofs and detailed data description are presented
in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
In this section, we present a benchmark model of job search (Lippman and McCall, 1976) with
one novel assumption about the agent’s time preferences: in addition to the null hypothesis of
exponential discounting, we consider the alternative hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting.
In the model, search eﬀort is endogenous, and it determines the probability of receiving a wage
oﬀer in any period. Hence, workers choose both the level of search eﬀo r ta n dt h er e s e r v a t i o n
for your job-hunt.” (Bolles, 2000. What Color is Your Parachute?, p. 87)
3By analyzing a diﬀerent form of intertemporal preferences, this paper is also related to the literature that
relaxes the intertemporal separability of the utility function in life-cycle labor supply models (Hotz, Kydland
and Sedlacek, 1988).
4wage to maximize the discounted stream of utility. The assumption of endogenous search eﬀort
is not new in the literature (Burdett and Mortensen, 1978; Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang, 1991;
Mortensen, 1986), even though most search models focus exclusively on the reservation wage
policy. This seems at odds with several pieces of evidence. First, empirical ﬁndings suggest
that variation in unemployment duration is largely due to variation in the oﬀer arrival rate,
and not in reservation wages (Devine and Kiefer, 1991). Second, direct measures of job search
are good predictors of post-unemployment outcomes (Barron and Mellow, 1981; Holzer, 1988).
2.1 Setting
The model is set in discrete time; it is helpful, although by no means necessary, to think
of a week as the time unit. Consider an inﬁnitely lived worker who is unemployed at time
t = 0. In each period of unemployment, the worker exerts search eﬀort s, parameterized as
the probability of obtaining a job oﬀer; therefore, s ∈ [0,1]. In every period the agent incurs
ac o s to fs e a r c hc(s), a bounded, twice diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly convex function
of s on [0,1]. In order to simplify the characterization of the solution, we also assume no ﬁxed
costs of search, i.e., c(0) = 0.
Upon receiving a job oﬀer, the worker must decide whether to accept it or not. The job oﬀer
is characterized by a wage w, which is a realization of a random variable W with cumulative
distribution function F. We further assume that F has bounded support [x,x] and strictly
positive density f over the support. If the worker accepts the oﬀer, he becomes employed and
receives, starting from the next period, a quantity w, which we refer to as the wage, even
though it may also include non-pecuniary aspects of the job. We assume F to be known to
the worker, constant over time and independent of search eﬀort. In other words, search eﬀort
determines how often the individual samples out of F, not the distribution being sampled.
We also allow for the possibility of layoﬀ. At the end of each period of employment, the worker
is laid oﬀ with known probability q ∈ [0,1], in which case he becomes unemployed starting
from next period. With probability 1 − q, the worker continues to be employed at wage w.
Additional technical assumptions A1-A3 are given in the Appendix.
Summing up, the timing of a period t of unemployment is as follows:
1. The worker decides the amount of search eﬀort s and pays cost of search c(s).
2. He receives b, the utility associated with unemployment, incorporating value of leisure,
possible stigma, and the monetary value of unemployment beneﬁts.
53. With probability s he then receives a job oﬀer w (drawn from F).
4. Finally, contingent on receiving an oﬀer, he accepts it or declines it. If he accepts, he is
employed with wage w starting from period t +1 . I fn oo ﬀer is received or the oﬀer is
declined, the worker searches again in period t +1 .
Two ﬁnal assumptions apply. First, we assume that the beneﬁts b, the distribution F and the
function c are time invariant. Second, we focus on workers’ search behavior and abstract from
the response of ﬁrms.
2.2 Time preferences
The assumption of exponential discounting is by far the most common in economics, and
therefore we take it as our null hypothesis. In addition, we consider the alternative hypothesis
that agents are impatient if the rewards are to be obtained in the near future, but relatively
patient when choosing between rewards to be accrued in the distant future. Thaler (1981) uses
hypothetical questions on comparisons between immediate and delayed payoﬀs to elicit annual
discount rates. He ﬁnds that the annualized discount rate computed for a 3 month delay is
two to ﬁve times higher than the annualized discount rate computed at a 3 year horizon.4 This
form of discounting implies that agents prefer a larger, later reward over a smaller, earlier one
as long as the rewards are suﬃciently distant in time; however, as both rewards get closer
in time, the agent may choose the smaller, earlier reward. In an experiment with monetary
rewards an overwhelming majority of subjects exhibit such reversal of preferences (Kirby and
Herrnstein, 1995).
To allow for a higher discount rate in the short-run that in the long-run, we assume that agents
have hyperbolic discount functions (Strotz, 1956; Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Laibson, 1997). The
discount function is equal to 1 for t =0a n dt oβδt for t =1 ,2,...with β ≤ 1. Therefore, the





The implied discount factor from today to the next period is βδ, while the discount factor
between any two periods in the future is simply δ ≥ βδ. This matches the main feature of the
experimental evidence – high short-run discounting, low long-run discounting.
4Similar ﬁndings have been replicated using ﬁnancially sophisticated subjects (Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil,
1989), monetary payments and incentive-compatible elicitation procedures (Kirby, 1997).
6We interpret β as the parameter of short-run patience and δ as the parameter of long-run
patience. For β = 1 we obtain the null hypothesis of time-consistent exponential preferences
with discount function δt.F o rβ<1 we obtain the alternative hypothesis of hyperbolic time-
inconsistent preferences. We further distinguish between the cases of sophistication and naivet´ e
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). A sophisticated hyperbolic agent has rational expectations:
she is aware that her future preferences will be hyperbolic as well. A na¨ ıve hyperbolic agent
believes incorrectly that in the future he will behave as an exponential agent with β =1 .
2.3 The Optimization Problem
For any period t, we can write down the maximization problem of an unemployed worker for
given continuation payoﬀ V U
t+1 when unemployed and V E
t+1(w) when employed at wage w.T h e

















where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of wage oﬀers F. Expression
(2) is easily interpretable: the worker in period t receives beneﬁts b and pays the cost of search
c(st). The continuation payoﬀs are discounted by the factor βδ, where β is the additional
term due to hyperbolic discounting (for the exponential worker, β = 1). With probability st
the worker receives a wage oﬀer w that he can then accept – thus obtaining, starting from
next period, the continuation payoﬀ from employment V E
t+1(w) – or reject, in which case he
gains next period the continuation payoﬀ from unemployment, V U
t+1. With probability 1 − st,
the worker does not ﬁnd a job and therefore receives V U
t+1. Since we focus on a stationary
environment, we can drop the time subscripts on the value functions. Thus, the continuation
payoﬀ from employment at wage w is
V E(w)=w + δ
£
qV U +( 1− q)V E(w)
¤
, (3)
since the worker at any period is laid oﬀ with probability q.
Expression (2) shows that the optimal search and wage acceptance policy depend on the
strategies of all future selves through the continuation payoﬀs V E(w)a n dV U. Since diﬀerent
selves of the same individual have contrasting interests – each one would like to delegate
search to the others – we treat the problem as an intrapersonal game between the selves. In
k e e p i n gw i t ht h et r a d i t i o ni nt h eh y p e r b o l i cd i s c ounting literature, we look for Markov perfect
equilibria of the above game. The principal feature of Markov perfect equilibria is that the
strategies should not depend on payoﬀ-irrelevant elements. As a consequence, in our setting
7the strategies of the players do not depend directly on actions taken at previous periods.
Propositions A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix characterize Markov perfect equilibria. Given the
stationarity of the search environment, we concentrate our attention on stationary equilibria.
The following result holds.
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of equilibrium) A stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium of the above game exists and is unique for all types of agents.5
The uniqueness of the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium diﬀerentiates this setting from
other models of time-inconsistent agents. Harris and Laibson (2001) show that multiplicity of
equilibria is the norm for hyperbolic consumers in a discrete time consumption-savings setting.
The intuition for the uniqueness result in a search setting is straightforward. Since search in
the present and in the future are substitutes, we do not observe a multiplicity of equilibria
where all the selves either search little, or search much.
Since strategies should not depend on past actions, the wage acceptance policy consists of a
reservation wage decision: the worker accepts all wage oﬀers higher than a threshold value.
Using expressions (2) and (3) and the stationarity assumption, we can solve for the reservation
wage in equilibrium:
w∗ =( 1− δ)V U. (4)
The higher the continuation payoﬀ when unemployed, the higher the reservation wage: the
worker has more incentives to wait one additional period. More importantly, the reservation
wage does not depend directly on the short-run discount factor β. A worker that accepts an
oﬀer in period t will start working and receiving a wage only starting in period t +1 . The
worker therefore either enjoys the beneﬁts of the outstanding oﬀer starting tomorrow, or waits
to receive an even better oﬀer at some later period. Given that this decision does not involve
any payoﬀ at period t, only the long-run discount factor δ matters.




1 − δ(1 − q)
·Z x
w∗
(u − w∗)dF (u)
¸
. (5)
At the optimum, the marginal cost of increasing the probability of ﬁnding a job equals the
marginal beneﬁt, which is the expected present value of obtaining a job oﬀer in excess of the
5In a non-stationary environment, existence and uniqueness of the solution are guaranteed if the horizon is
ﬁnite, or if the environment becomes eventually stationary. This second case applies, for instance, if workers
receive unemployment beneﬁts for a limited number of weeks.
8reservation wage. The higher is the layoﬀ probability q, the lower is the marginal beneﬁto f
search since the expected duration of a job decreases. As is apparent from expression (5),
short-term impatience β directly aﬀects the search eﬀort.
2.4 Na¨ ıve agents
To build up intuition on the features of the equilibrium for the non-standard assumption of
hyperbolic discounting, consider ﬁrst the behavior of a na¨ ıve hyperbolic worker. The na¨ ıve
worker believes that his future selves will have exponential preferences and thus will behave
like the selves of an exponential worker with equal δ; therefore the continuation payoﬀso fa
na¨ ıve and exponential worker coincide: V U,n(β,δ)=V U,e(δ). Given equality of continuation
payoﬀs, equation (4) implies that the reservation wages coincide as well:
wn∗(β,δ)=we∗(δ). (6)
The reservation wage is chosen by comparison of continuation payoﬀs that do not depend on
short-run impatience either directly–only future payoﬀsa r ea ﬀected–or indirectly through
expectations of future behavior. Therefore, short-run impatience does not aﬀect the reservation
wage for a na¨ ıve worker.
By contrast, short-run impatience has a strong eﬀe c to ns e a r c he ﬀort. A comparison of the
ﬁrst order conditions for na¨ ıve and exponential agents using wn∗(β,δ)=we∗(δ)y i e l d s
c0 (σn(β,δ)) = βc0 (σe(δ)). (7)
By convexity of c(·), search eﬀort σn(β,δ) is strictly increasing in β. An increase in short-
term impatience (1 − β) reduces the present value of the beneﬁts of investing in search and
therefore leads to lower search eﬀort. This eﬀect is accentuated by the fact that na¨ ıve agents
(erroneously) believe that the future selves will search intensively and that, consequently, they
do not need to search at present.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of hyperbolic preferences on the exit rate from unemployment. The
probability of exiting unemployment h depends on the probability of receiving a wage oﬀer,
and the probability of accepting it: h = s[1 − F (w∗)]. Short-run impatience inﬂuences only
search eﬀort: therefore decreases in β lead to lower exit rates. Na¨ ıve agents exit unemployment
less than exponential agents with equal long-run discount factor. Note that this result does
not require stationarity of b, c(·)o rF.
92.5 Sophisticated agents
A result of the previous Section is that na¨ ıve hyperbolic agents search less than they expect to.
We now show that sophisticated individuals, who correctly foresee their future search eﬀort,
search less than they would like to. This is an example of a general feature of sophisticated
hyperbolic agents who, in the absence of a perfect commitment technology, invest less than
they desire.6
Suppose that a market exists for commitment devices that induce the current as well as all the
future selves of an individual to exert a given search eﬀo r t .T h en e x tP r o p o s i t i o ns h o w st h a ta
sophisticated individual would be willing to pay a positive price for a commitment device that
raises search at all periods above the equilibrium level σs(β,δ) determined by (4) and (5). The
reservation utility is chosen optimally for the new search level according to (4).
Proposition 1 There exists an ε>0 such that an increase of the search eﬀort in all periods
from σs(β,δ) to σs(β,δ)+ε strictly increases the net present utility of all the selves of a
sophisticated hyperbolic agent.
2.6 Impatience for exponential and hyperbolic agents
We now characterize the eﬀect of impatience on labor market outcomes. As a corollary of
the results below, the comparative statics with respect to β allows us to compare equilibrium
behavior for hyperbolic (β<1) and exponential agents (β = 1) with the same long-run
discount factor δ. Proposition 2 illustrates the eﬀects of impatience on search eﬀort and the
reservation wage:
Proposition 2 (Search and reservation wage) (a) The equilibrium level of search eﬀort s
is strictly increasing in β and δ for all types of agents; (b) The reservation wage w∗ is strictly
increasing in δ for all agents; (c) The reservation wage w∗ is independent of β for naive agents,
and strictly increasing in β for sophisticated agents with β<1.
The eﬀects of long-run and short-run impatience on search and reservation wages are analogous:
an increase in impatience (a decrease in β or δ) reduces the incentive to invest in the future and
6We assume no commitment devices available for sophisticated agents – the present self cannot constrain the
search behavior of future selves. In the labor market, employment agencies can be viewed as partial commitment
devices. Since workers still have to prepare a r´ esum´ e and go to interviews, delegation of some search activities
may attenuate but is not likely to solve the tendency to delay search.
10therefore reduces search eﬀort. As a consequence, the value of staying unemployed is lower and
the reservation wage decreases. Although changes in β and δ have a qualitatively similar eﬀect,
the magnitudes diﬀer. In order to determine the eﬀect on the exit rate from unemployment
h, the magnitudes are indeed important. More impatient individuals both exert lower search
eﬀort and become less selective in their acceptance strategy: the global eﬀect of impatience on
the exit rate is a priori ambiguous. The next two propositions, the key theoretical results in
the paper, show that under weak conditions it is possible to obtain precise predictions:
Proposition 3 (β impatience) (a) The exit rate h = s[1 − F (w∗)] for naive workers is
strictly increasing in β; (b) The exit rate for sophisticated w o r k e r si ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nβ if





at x = w∗. (8)
Proposition 3 states that an increase in short-term impatience (a decrease in β)l e a d st ol o w e r
exit rates from unemployment. Such changes aﬀect search eﬀort directly since they make the
cost of search more salient; on the other hand, they aﬀect the reservation wage (if at all) only
indirectly through a sophistication eﬀect: only because the sophisticated worker knows that
her future selves will search little, does she accept more wages today. In Table 1, discussed in
Section 5.4, we show that in a calibrated version of the model the eﬀect of changes in β on
the reservation wage are also quantitatively small for sophisticated agents. Figure 1a plots the
relationship between β and the exit rate for calibrated values of the parameters.
Result (b) of Proposition 3 holds under the weak requirement (8). For β equal to 2/3, av a l u e
in the lower range of estimates in the literature, condition (8) requires that the increase in the
expected reemployment wage associated with a reservation wage increase be less than threefold.
This condition is always satisﬁed by the class of log-concave wage distributions, including the
normal, the exponential and the uniform, and, for plausible values of the parameters, by most
distributions used in the search literature.
Proposition 3 establishes that increases in short-term patience are associated with higher exit
rates from unemployment. The eﬀect of the long-term patience parameter δ o nt h ee x i tr a t ei s
described in the following Proposition. Deﬁne the marginal cost elasticity η(s)=sc00(s)/c0 (s),
and the failure rate ψ(w)=f(w)/(1 − F (w)).
Proposition 4 (δ impatience) F o ra l lt y p e so fw o r k e r s ,t h e r ee x i s t sal a y o ﬀ probability ¯ q>0
such that for given q ≤ ¯ q: (a) the exit rate h is strictly decreasing in δ for δ close to 1; (b)
if η(s) is (weakly) increasing in s and ψ(w) is (weakly) increasing in w, then there exists a
11δmax(q) ∈ (0,1) such that the exit rate is increasing in δ for δ<δ max(q), and decreasing in δ
for δ>δ max(q).
To our knowledge, Proposition 4 is a novel result in the literature.7 It characterizes the eﬀect
of the exponential discount factor δ on the exit rate in a model with both a search eﬀort and
a reservation wage choice. Result (a) guarantees that for suﬃciently patient individuals the
exit rate is a decreasing function of δ. Consider ﬁrst the case of no layoﬀ (q equal to zero): the
wage is received for all future periods. As δ approaches one, the worker values increasingly
more the beneﬁts of receiving a high wage forever; therefore he both searches intensively and
becomes very selective in his job oﬀer acceptance strategy. There is an asymmetry between
the two eﬀects. The marginal costs of increasing search eﬀort at some point outweighs the
beneﬁts, given the assumptions of concave costs and ﬁnite support of the wage distribution.
An inﬁnitely patient agent is better oﬀ becoming extremely selective. Therefore the exit rate
converges to zero. This result depends on the probability of layoﬀ being suﬃciently small:
below we show that, for plausible values of the layoﬀ probability q, the exit rate is indeed
decreasing in δ for δ close to 1.
Under appropriate assumptions, Proposition 4(b) allows a global characterization of the exit
rate as a function of δ.T h eﬁrst assumption – marginal cost elasticity η(s)i n c r e a s i n gi ns
– requires that search become increasingly costly at the margin. The second assumption –
failure rate increasing in w –i ss a t i s ﬁed by all log-concave wage distributions. Under these
conditions, the exit rate as a function of δ is hump shaped. Figure 1b illustrates this shape for
a model calibrated on empirical data under selected parametric assumptions (see Appendix C).
The calibrated model can be used to estimate δ
y
max, the level of the yearly discount factor at
which the exit rate starts to decrease as a function of δ.8 The top panel of Table 1 displays δ
y
max,
as well as the corresponding probability of accepting a wage oﬀer. Interestingly, δ
y
max is never
greater than 0.80 and in general is signiﬁcantly smaller. The benchmark calibration implies
a yearly discount rate of 54 percent, a value well beyond the range of estimates considered
plausible in the literature. In a setting essentially identical to ours, Wolpin (1987) estimates a
95 percent conﬁdence interval for the annual discount factor to be [0.936, 0.963], similar to the
estimates in the consumption and ﬁnance literature (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002). A second
interesting feature is that at δ = δ
y
max the individual accepts 90 percent or more of the wage
oﬀers. Given that the probability of acceptance is decreasing in δ (Proposition 2b), this implies
7Burdett and Mortensen (1978) and Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang (1991) derive the comparative statics
eﬀects of impatience on search eﬀort and the reservation wage, but do not derive the eﬀects of impatience on
the exit rate.
8For ease of interpretation, we present these results in terms of the yearly discount factor δ





max the individual accepts essentially any wage oﬀer. Extremely high acceptance
probabilities contrast with our estimates from the NLSY data (0.54) as well as with previous
estimates in the literature (Holzer, 1987, Blau and Robins 1990).9
The exit rate, therefore, is increasing in long-run patience δ only for high levels of discounting
and for a counterfactually high acceptance probability. Over the plausible range of values for
δ, the exit rate is decreasing in long-run patience.
2.7 Robustness10
Continuous time model. While in this Section we have focused on a discrete-time model,
it is possible to extend the above results to continuous time using the instantaneous gratiﬁ-
cation framework of Harris and Laibson (2002). The instantaneous gratiﬁcation model diﬀers
from standard continuous-time models with discount factor e−rt because the discount factor
is stochastic. Over a period ∆t, the discount factor may decrease to αe−rt, with α ≤ 1, with




αe−rt. The parameter α is the equivalent of the short-run discounting
parameter β and speciﬁes the drop in discounting that occurs once the discount function transi-
tions from the present to the future. The parameter γ speciﬁes how quickly the discount factor
drop-oﬀ occurs. The case γ →∞is the case of instantaneous gratiﬁcation and is the most
direct analogue of the hyperbolic discounting model presented above. Notice that assuming
either α =1o rγ = 0 brings us back to a standard continuous-time exponential model.11
In Appendix D we set up the equivalent of the job-search model in continuous time for the
case of no layoﬀ (q = 0) and show that, in the case of instantaneous gratiﬁcation, we obtain
the same ﬁrst order conditions as in the discrete-time model, with the diﬀerence that the
parameter α replaces β, and the discount rate r replacing the discount factor δ according to
δ =1 /(1 + r). Since the ﬁrst-order conditions are the same, all the results that we prove in
the paper apply also to the continuous-time case.
9Structural estimates of acceptance probability range from low values of acceptance–0.21 to 0.45 in Eckstein
and Wolpin (1995, Table 4)–to acceptance probabilities very close to 1 (Wolpin, 1987; van den Berg, 1990).
10We thank two very perceptive referees for the suggestions that led us to add this Section.
11Note that this model is diﬀerent from one in which agents the discount rate is simply equal to the interest
rate, workers are perfectly rational and time-consistent, know that the interest rate will drop at some point in
the future from r to r
0, but do not know exactly when. In this alternative model, agents understand that once
the interest rate has fallen it will not change any more, and hence optimal decisions from that point onwards will
b eb a s e do nt h el o w e ri n t e r e s tr a t e ,r
0. By contrast, in the hyperbolic model (sophisticated) agents understand
that in every period in the future the discount factor between the present and the immediate future will always
be e
−rt.
13Timing of wage receipts. The reader may be concerned that the assumption that the wage
is paid one period after the acceptance of a job is crucial. The continuous-time model shows
that this is not the case. In this latter model, the wage starts being paid oﬀ immediately in
case of job oﬀer.
On-the-job search. If search on the job is as costly as search when unemployed, then workers
accept any oﬀered wage above b, regardless of time preferences. Therefore, impatience aﬀects
exit rates only through search and Proposition 4 does not hold. However, if search on the job
is suﬃciently more costly, the eﬀects outlined in this paper will apply (the model in the paper
implicitly assumes inﬁnite costs of on-the-job search). Direct evidence on the eﬀectiveness of
search while unemployed versus search on the job is inconclusive.12
Shifts of the wage distribution. An alternative possibility is one in which search eﬀort
aﬀects the mean of the wage distribution as well as the probability of obtaining an oﬀer. The
ﬁrst order condition for search eﬀort s∗ in equation (5) would still take the form of equality
between immediate marginal cost of eﬀort and future beneﬁts discounted by βδ.The reservation
wage choice, again, would not depend directly on β. Based on this, it is unlikely that the main
results in the paper would be aﬀected.
2.8 Summary
In the above Section we have characterized the behavior of workers with hyperbolic time
preferences. Impatient hyperbolic individuals (individuals with low β) display lower search
eﬀort when compared to exponential individuals with the same δ. The reservation wage for
exponential and hyperbolic agents, instead, is (essentially) the same. The main feature of
hyperbolic individuals is that they devote little eﬀort to search, not that they accept many
oﬀers. The latter feature is consistent with the anecdotal advice given to job seekers (Bolles,
2000). The general recommendation is to spend more time on job search, rather than to be
more selective.
The Section also highlights a fundamental diﬀerence between long-run and short-run impa-
tience in job search. Variation in the short-run discount factor β aﬀects mostly the search
decision; therefore, the exit rate is increasing in β. For suﬃciently patient individuals we ob-
tain the opposite result for variation in δ: more patient agents are more selective in their choice
of reservation wages and therefore exit unemployment later. The intuition for this result in-
12Holzer (1987) ﬁnds that search when unemployed is more eﬀective, whereas Blau and Robins (1990) ﬁnd
the opposite, but note that unemployed workers do not accept all oﬀers, and generally do stop searching once
they ﬁnd a job.
14volves the diﬀerent timing of the search and reservation wage decisions. The search decision
involves a trade-oﬀ between immediate search costs and future beneﬁts of accepting an oﬀer,
occurring within a few weeks. Over this limited horizon, variation in short-run impatience
matters more than variation in long-run impatience. The reservation wage decision, instead,
involves a comparison of the long-term consequences of obtaining a certain wage or waiting to
receive an even better oﬀer. Given that current payoﬀs are essentially not aﬀected, variation
in long-term discounting matters more than variation in short-term discounting. In a nutshell,
due to the diﬀerent time horizons variation in δ drives mostly variation in reservation wages,
while variation in β d r i v e sm o s t l yv a r i a t i o ni ns e a r c he ﬀort. The result holds for both the
discrete-time and the continuous-time models of hyperbolic discounting.
This result suggests a way to distinguish empirically between diﬀerent types of impatience. If
individuals have exponential time preferences, more impatient individuals (low δ) should have
higher exit rates from unemployment, due to lower reservation wages. If impatient workers have
hyperbolic preferences with a high degree of short-run impatience (low β), instead, impatient
workers should exit less frequently, due to lower search eﬀort, while reservation wages should
be essentially unaﬀected by the degree of impatience.
3E m p i r i c a l S t r a t e g y
To test the predictions of the model, we use two large longitudinal data sets, the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), that
include detailed information on unemployment spells, on job search activities, and on a wide
range of behavioral indicators that can be interpreted as correlates of impatience. In the
following, we brieﬂy describe the construction of unemployment spells in the two data sets,
and then discuss our choice of impatience measures. A more detailed description of the data
set construction is given in Appendix B.
3.1 Unemployment Spells in the PSID and the NLSY
The sample of unemployment spells in the PSID is similar to that used in Katz (1986) and
Katz and Meyer (1990). Between 1981 and 1983, PSID heads of household were asked to
provide detailed information on up to three unemployment spells contained at least in part
in the previous calendar year. For every individual, we consider only the last unemployment
spell mentioned at each interview. An unemployment spell makes it into our sample only if
the respondent was a male head of household between 20 and 65 years of age. We retain more
15than one unemployment spell per individual where it is possible to determine with certainty
that a given spell is not the same as a previously mentioned one.
For the NLSY, we use the Work History ﬁles to construct a week by week account of every
male worker’s labor force status from 1978 to 1996. Our measure of unemployment reﬂects the
concept underlying the model: a worker is unemployed if he is out of a job but willing to work.
Therefore, we classify as unemployment spells all the periods of nonemployment in which at
least some search took place. This measure diﬀers from the conventional deﬁnition in that a
worker who does not actively search during the entire spell can still be classiﬁed as unemployed.
We retain only those spells that were reported in 1985 or later by male respondents who were
not part of the military subsample, and were not enrolled in school. This ensures that our
sample of spells includes mainly workers with strong attachment to the labor force, and that
our impatience proxies are measured prior to the beginning of the unemployment spells.
Table 2 gives summary statistics for the sample of unemployment spells for the PSID and the
NLSY. The mean length of unemployment spells is essentially identical in the two samples.
In the PSID, the survivor function is higher at long durations.13 In both samples, many
workers have repeated spells of unemployment. Finally, in the PSID sample a relatively large
number of completed spells ends in recall to the previous employer. Overall, the distribution
of unemployment durations in the two samples is comparable to that of previous studies.
3.2 Measures of Impatience
Attempts to measure rates of time preference have so far been conducted almost exclusively in
laboratory experiments. Yet individuals pursue many activities that indirectly reveal a pref-
erence for early gratiﬁcation. Relatively impatient individuals engage frequently in activities
characterized by immediate rewards and delayed costs. Conversely, patient individuals are
likely to take on activities with immediate costs and delayed beneﬁts. We collect information
on several such types of behavior from the PSID and the NLSY in order to construct measures
of impatience.
Throughout the paper, we make three identifying assumptions. First, higher measures of
impatience may be associated with either higher short-run (1 − β) or higher long-run (1 − δ)
impatience. Second, the individual’s discount rate is the same across diﬀerent activities. Third,
the ranking of individuals with respect to impatience does not vary over time.14 Ap o t e n t i a l
13I nt h eP S I Dt h e r ea r em a n ym o r ec e n s o r e ds p e l l sd u et o sample construction; any spell that was ongoing
a tt h et i m eo ft h ei n t e r v i e wi n1 9 8 3i sc e n s o r e d .
14Despite the fact that time preferences may vary over time, individual diﬀerences in impatience appear to
16confounding element is that, even if the third assumption is satisﬁed, our measures may change
over time because of external factors. For instance, suppose that a long unemployment spell
induces an individual to start smoking, and that this behavior persists over time. If the proxy
(smoking in this example) is measured after the occurrence of the spell, we could ﬁnd a spurious
negative correlation between the measure of impatience and the exit rate. In order to avoid
this problem, we choose proxies of impatience that are measured prior to the occurrence of the
unemployment spells.15 The only exception is the bank account measure in the PSID. Finally,
we adjust, where possible, the impatience measures to eliminate confounding elements.
We should note from the outset that our measures are only imperfect proxies for impatience,
and they may be picking up a number of other individual traits (unobserved wage potential,
tastes for leisure, risk preferences, etc.) apart from time preferences. We return to this point in
Section 5.3 below, where we argue that interpreting the proxies as any other single individual
trait would generate predictions that are at odds with the empirical results.
NLSY Assessment of Impatience. At the end of each NLSY interview, the interviewer is
asked to specify whether the respondent’s attitude was “1. Friendly and interested; 2. Coop-
erative and not interested; 3. Impatient and restless; 4. Hostile.” An impatient respondent
reveals a dislike for the immediate burden of answering the NLSY questionnaire, even though at
some previous time he or she had agreed to be interviewed (perhaps attracted by the monetary
compensation or by the warm glow that comes from cooperating with a scientiﬁce n t e r p r i s e ) .
Such behavior is similar to that of an unemployed worker who plans to ﬁll in forms and job
applications, but then postpones such activities because of aversion to the immediate costs.
A dummy for the third response was recorded between 1980 and 1985: the raw measure of
impatience was calculated as the average of these dummies. Since individuals with a high
opportunity value of time may be more likely to exhibit impatience during the interview, we
adjust the raw indicator by partialling out the eﬀects of employment status, hours worked, and
wages at the time of the interview.16
Having a Bank Account. Simple models of savings behavior predict that more patient
individuals delay consumption and accumulate more wealth, and are therefore more likely to
be quite stable: the ability of young children to delay gratiﬁcation correlates strongly with achievement later in
life (Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez, 1989).
15Even correlates of impatience which are measured before unemployment spells may be biased: this is the
case if individuals pick up impatient behavior during an unemployment spell, and unemployment durations are
correlated over time. It is hard to believe, however, that this is a ﬁrst-order eﬀect.
16We have also attempted to adjust this measure for interview length, since longer interviews (due for example
to more unemployment spells) may make the respondent impatient. The correlation between adjusted and
unadjusted measure is .9999.
17have some type of bank account. The decision to open a bank account depends also on short-
run impatience. For example, an impatient salaried worker may be so eager to spend his weekly
paycheck on Friday that he prefers to cash it in immediately at a check-cashing center (and
pay an exorbitant transaction fee) rather than wait two days to have the money available for
withdrawal from the bank.17 Alternatively, a hyperbolic worker may delay opening a checking
account at a bank. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) show that a relatively mild degree of short-
run impatience, if associated with na¨ ıvet´ e, may lead an individual to postpone forever a simple
ﬁnancial operation which has small present costs and substantial delayed beneﬁts. As a raw
measure of impatience, we use a simple indicator of whether individuals have any money in a
checking or saving account in 1989 (for the PSID), or in any type of ﬁnancial vehicle in 1985
(for the NLSY). Since the presence of a bank account may reﬂect past labor market success
in addition to impatience, we adjust the raw indicator for the individual’s age and cumulative
past earnings.
Use of Contraceptives. An individual that has sexual intercourse with a partner must
decide whether to use contraceptives: the higher the level of patience, the higher the value of
avoiding sexually transmitted diseases and undesired pregnancies. We therefore expect more
patient individuals to use contraceptives consistently, and more so when involved in casual
relationships.18 In the NLSY for the years 1984-1985, all individuals that have had sexual
intercourse in the month prior to the interview are asked about the use of contraceptives. We
classify individuals who use contraceptives as patient, and individuals who do not use them and
are not married as impatient. We assign a missing value to married individuals who did not
use any birth-control method, since we cannot know whether these individuals were planning
to have a child.19
Life Insurance. Workers that choose among diﬀerent job oﬀers take into account non-
monetary as well as monetary compensation. According to the theory of compensating wage
diﬀerentials, individuals whose employers provide life insurance coverage should have a taste
for the long horizon: impatient workers could have chosen a similar job with a higher wage but
no insurance coverage. The raw measure in the NLSY is an indicator that takes the value of 1
if the current job includes life insurance coverage. Since the likelihood of having life insurance
depends on whether the worker has family and on the availability of jobs with fringe beneﬁts,
we adjust the raw measure by partialling out the eﬀects of marital status, number of children
17We thank Jerry Green for suggesting this example.
18Contraceptive use indicates both attitudes toward risk and time preferences. Controlling for direct measures
of risk aversion did not aﬀect the results.
19Assigning a missing value to all married individuals does not alter the results substantially.
18and age.
Health Habits: Smoking and Drinking. In a pioneering study, Fuchs (1982) observed
that the high correlation between health outcomes and schooling can be explained by the fact
that relatively patient individuals are more likely to engage in healthy behavior and to invest
in human capital accumulation, as both activities can be regarded as involving a trade-oﬀ
between present and future payoﬀs. Fuchs found that implicit interest rates calculated from
hypothetical questions on immediate or delayed acceptance of lottery prizes were correlated
with smoking behavior, in the direction predicted by theory. Following this insight, we use
smoking and heavy drinking as measures of impatience: both activities are pleasurable at
the time of consumption but detrimental to health afterwards. In both samples, the smoking
variable is a simple indicator for whether the individual smoked prior to the beginning of the
unemployment spells. For the NLSY we also use the number of times an individual has had a
hangover in the past month as a measure of impatience.
Vocational Clubs in High School. High school students participate in a wide range of time-
consuming activities that will likely yield rewards in the future. In particular, some students
are members of associations that are intended to prepare them for future jobs. The likely
purpose of participating in these clubs is to obtain scholarships, create a network of contacts
and build their own future career. This type of forward looking behavior is characteristic of
patient individuals. Membership in these associations usually does not require particular skills
so it is unlikely that we are selecting only the gifted students. Using the 1984 wave of the
NLSY, we construct a measure of participation in vocational clubs in high school by taking
the average over dummies indicating participation in any one of seven vocational clubs.20
In Table 3 we present summary statistics for our measures of impatience in the two samples.
The ﬁrst column displays summary statistics for the raw variables used to construct the ﬁnal
measures. We then adjust (whenever necessary) the raw measures and transform them so
that higher impatience is always associated with a higher value of the measure. To facilitate
comparison, we also standardize each measure, so that the ﬁnal variable has mean zero and
standard deviation one in the entire male population.
We report the summary statistics of the impatience measures, raw and ﬁnal, for the sample
of individuals who appear at least once in the unemployment spell sample (columns 2 and 3).
We also report the ﬁnal measures for the actual sample of spells (column 4). The means of
20The seven vocational clubs are: American Industrial Arts Association, Distributive Education Clubs of
America, Future Business Leaders of America, Future Farmers of America, Health Occupations Student Associ-
ation, Oﬃce Education Association (now called the Business Professionals of America), and Vocations Industrial
Club of America.
19most of the ﬁnal variables are positive, implying that unemployed individuals rank relatively
high in our measures of impatience when compared to the entire male population.
If the underlying factor behind these diverse behavioral traits is impatience, the correlations
between all the variables should be positive. In fact, of the 21 pairwise correlations between
the impatience measures in the NLSY, all but two have a positive sign and 16 are statistically
diﬀerent from zero. Partial correlations between the variables, after controlling for educational
attainment, cognitive test scores, race and parental education, exhibit the same pattern. The
value of Cronbach’s reliability measure is 0.278, reﬂecting an average correlation between the
measures of 0.052. The correlation between the two measures in the PSID is 0.099. Low
correlations among diﬀerent measures of an individual trait are not uncommon in the literature
(see Glaeser et al., 2000), and expected in this case. The impatience proxies are noisy measures,
derived from diﬀerent sections and years of the NLSY. Measurement error is likely to attenuate
the correlations between impatience and job search outcomes, but should not alter their sign.
We use factor analysis to create an aggregate measure of impatience. The details of the
factor analysis are given in the Appendix. The aggregate measure is a weighted average of
the individual variables: the measures that receive most weight are smoking, having a bank
account, and use of contraceptives, while participation in vocational clubs receives almost no
weight.
4E x i t R a t e R e s u l t s
4.1 Kaplan-Meier Estimates
We ﬁrst illustrate graphically the exit rates from unemployment for patient and impatient
workers. Figures 2 and 3 plot the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard function in the PSID
and the NLSY respectively.21 For the PSID sample (Figure 2), we compare the exit rates of
workers with and without a bank account (top panel), and of smokers and non-smokers. In
both cases, the exit rates of workers which we classify as impatient are substantially lower than
those of workers classiﬁed as patient, and especially so in the ﬁrst weeks, where the exit rates
are more precisely estimated. Figure 3 shows the results for the NLSY: in the top two panels
we compare the exit rates of smokers and non-smokers (right panel), and of workers with a
high and low propensity to have a bank account (i.e., workers in the top quartile and in the
bottom quartile of the measure). In the bottom panel we compare the exit rates of workers
21The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the hazard function at t weeks is calculated simply as dt/rt, where dt is the
number of completed spells lasting exactly t weeks, and rt is the number of spells lasting t or more weeks.
20in the top and bottom quartiles of the aggregate impatience measure. Once again, impatient
individuals have substantially lower exit rates than patient ones. Prima facie, impatience has
a large eﬀect on job search outcomes in the direction predicted by the hyperbolic discounting
model.
4.2 Benchmark Results
We adopt a Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) to quantify the diﬀerence in hazard
rates between patient and impatient workers, and to assess the robustness of the ﬁndings
to the inclusion of a broad set of control variables. Let tj be the observed duration of an







where no parametric speciﬁcation is assumed for the baseline hazard λ0 (tj). Notice that in
our sample a given individual may have more than one unemployment spell. We enter each
of multiple spells by the same individual as separate observations, and, following Lin and Wei
(1989), allow for robust standard errors that take into account this form of clustering.
The Kaplan-Meier estimates presented in the previous Section provide evidence on the simple
correlation between impatience and exit rates. However, there are important individual dif-
ferences in the productivity of search, in the value of unemployment, and in the distribution
of wage oﬀers. Our estimates may be biased if the impatience proxies are correlated with
variables associated with the exit rate, and these variables are omitted from the regression.
Therefore we control as well as possible for measures of human capital, family background,
and other environmental factors. First of all, we include an extensive list of characteristics
of the worker’s job prior to the unemployment spell, including wage, industry and occupation
dummies, and previous tenure. These variables convey information about a worker’s potential
distribution of wage oﬀers that might be otherwise unobservable to the econometrician. We
also include control variables for demographic characteristics (age, race, education, marital
status, number of children), an indicator for health status, and cognitive ability as measured
by the AFQT score. These variables are meant to capture individual heterogeneity in produc-
tivity on the job and in job search activities. We include family background characteristics
such as parental education, father’s occupation, and whether any household members received
magazines, newspapers, or had a library card when the respondent was 14 years old. We also
add a group of geographic and macroeconomic indicators: dummies for region of residence; a
dummy for urban status; dummies for central city or SMSA residence; indicators for the lo-
21cal unemployment rate. Finally, we include a dummy for receipt of Unemployment Insurance
beneﬁts.
In Table 4 we present the benchmark estimates. Each row in the table reports the coeﬃcients on
the relevant measure of impatience from separate estimations of the Cox proportional hazards
model. For each sample, we report both the results of a simple model that includes only the
impatience measure, and the results of the full model that includes the entire set of control
variables.
The model without control variables (column 1) shows that most of the measures of impatience
are associated with lower exit rates. In the NLSY sample, a two standard deviation increase
in the interviewer’s assessment of impatience leads to an 11 percent increase in the exit rate
from unemployment. The coeﬃcients are of similar magnitude for the smoking variable, for
the propensity not to have life insurance at one’s job, and for non-participation in vocational
clubs. Increases in the propensity to have unsafe sex and in the propensity not to have a
bank account have somewhat larger eﬀects on the exit rate. The only variable that appears
to have no eﬀect on the exit rate is the measure of heavy drinking. Overall, a two standard
deviation increase in the aggregate impatience measure leads to a 30 percent drop in the exit
rate from unemployment. The magnitude of this estimate is substantial and comparable to
the eﬀect of human capital variables. In similar Cox models estimated in the NLSY, we ﬁnd
that 4 years of education raise the exit rate by approximately 15 percent; that individuals
at the 75th percentile of the distribution of AFQT scores have a 28 percent higher exit rate
than individuals at the 25th percentile; and that individuals at the 75th percentile of the wage
distribution prior to the unemployment spell have a 13 percent higher exit rate than individuals
at the 25th percentile.
The results for the NLSY are conﬁrmed when we analyze the two impatience measures available
in the PSID. In fact, the diﬀerence in exit rates between smokers and non-smokers, and between
workers with and without a bank account is larger than in the NLSY.
The results of the regressions with control variables are presented in column 2 in Table 4.22
Overall, including the control variables has the expected eﬀect; nearly all the coeﬃcients on
the impatience measures become smaller in absolute value. Most of them, however, remain
statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Arguably, some of the drop in the coeﬃcients may
be attributed to the inclusion of control variables that are themselves measures of impatience,
as is the case for education. In the PSID sample, the coeﬃcients on the smoking and bank
account variables remain almost unaltered. In the NLSY sample, the aggregate impatience
22The full set of coeﬃcients on the control variables is given in Appendix Table 1.
22measure remains strongly signiﬁcant: a two standard deviation increase in impatience is now
associated with an approximately 18 percent lower exit rate. This eﬀect is larger than the
eﬀect of four additional years of education (3 percent, insigniﬁcant), and also larger than the
eﬀect of moving from one end to the other of the interquartile range in the distribution of
AFQT scores (16 percent) and previous wages (7 percent).
Summing up, measures of impatience are mostly negatively correlated with the exit rate,
even after controlling for a large set of background variables. If most of this eﬀect depends
on impatience, then the model described in Section 2 implies that variation in rates of time
preference reﬂects variations in the degree of short-run impatience. In what follows, we employ
several diﬀerent strategies to assess the robustness of this result, and to eliminate possible
confounding elements. We concentrate mostly on the NLSY because of the greater wealth of
information available in this sample. We restrict our attention to models with the full set of
control variables.
4.3 Robustness checks
In Table 5, we present some alternative speciﬁcations of the hazard model, designed to assess
the robustness of the basic results. In the ﬁrst column, we report the results of the estimation
of a Cox model where all the measures of impatience are included simultaneously. The coeﬃ-
cients on the impatience measures are similar to those obtained when each variable is included
separately.
Last spell. In the second column of Table 5, we retain only the last spell for each individual.
The last spell of unemployment occurs when the worker is older and therefore more attached to
the labor force: such a spell ﬁts more adequately the concept of unemployment spell described
in Section 2. The main results are unchanged. Individual measures of impatience are negatively
correlated with the exit rate, and coeﬃcient estimates are comparable to those obtained in
Table 4.
Active search. In the third column, we explore whether the results are sensitive to the exact
deﬁnition of unemployment spells. We use an alternative deﬁnition of unemployment spells that
includes only the periods in which active search took place. The newly deﬁned unemployment
spells are substantially shorter, and more likely to be censored. The estimated coeﬃcients on
the measures of impatience are largely unaﬀected by this change: a two standard deviation
increase in the aggregate measure of impatience is associated with a 16 percent decrease in the
exit rate from unemployment.
23Measurement error. Finally, the above estimates are likely to suﬀer from considerable
measurement error bias, since our proxies are only imprecise measures of impatience. We
can correct for attenuation bias by transforming the model into a log-linear one,23 and then
instrumenting for each measure of impatience with all the remaining proxies. The OLS and
instrumental variable (IV) estimates for the log-linear model are presented in the fourth and
ﬁfth columns of Table 5. The IV estimates are an order of magnitude larger than the OLS es-
timates. In addition, all the variables are strongly signiﬁcant. The IV results suggest that the
benchmark estimates could be substantially attenuated because of measurement error. This
validates the above ﬁndings, even though the results should be viewed with some circumspec-
tion: the point estimates are imprecise and the F-statistic for the ﬁrst stage regressions is above
the conventional signiﬁcance level only when smoking and heavy drinking are the instrumented
variables.
Non-linearities. The empirical evidence presented so far indicates that the exit rate is
decreasing in measures of impatience. The estimated negative correlation between impatience
and exit rate could still be generated by variation in long-run patience if the exit rate is
hump-shaped as a function of δ (Figure 1b) and workers are suﬃciently impatient so that the
majority is located on the increasing side of the hump. We examine the plausibility of this
explanation by testing for the presence of a non-linear eﬀect of the patience measure.24 Figure
4 plots the predicted exit rates in a model that includes a quadratic term and speciﬁes a ﬂexible
step function for the aggregate measure of patience. The quadratic speciﬁcation is essentially
indistinguishable from the linear one. In addition, the predicted exit rates for diﬀerent deciles
in the distribution of patience are increasing throughout most of the range, including at high
levels of patience. There is no evidence that the exit rate is decreasing in δ for suﬃciently
patient individuals.
5 Reservation Wages and Search Eﬀort
5.1 Alternative Explanations: Human Capital?
We have established the presence of a strong negative relationship between the measures of
impatience and the exit rate from unemployment. It is legitimate to ask whether these measures
are indeed capturing individual time preferences, or whether instead they simply reﬂect human
23See Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980) for the necessary conditions for the model to admit a log-linear
transformation.
24The aggregate patience measure is the negative of the aggregate impatience measur e .W ep r e s e n tt h er e s u l t s
this way for ease of comparison with Figures 1a and 1b.
24capital. In the previous Section, we showed that the negative correlation is robust to the
inclusion of a large set of observable human capital measures. We now consider the possibility
that the measures of impatience are reﬂecting heterogeneity in human capital (or earnings
potential), represented by µ in the model. In Section 5.3 we explore the possibility that the
proxies capture variation in other parameters in the model.
According to the exponential discounting model, impatience should have a strong negative
correlation with the reservation wage. Similarly, if the measures are capturing human capital,
we should also observe a strong negative correlation with the reservation wage: individuals
with lower human capital receive worse oﬀers and need to lower their reservation wage (see
also Section 5.3). On the other hand, the hyperbolic discounting model predicts that the
correlation should be zero (na¨ ıve workers) or essentially zero (sophisticated workers). We
can therefore test the hyperbolic model against the exponential and human capital model by
measuring the size of the eﬀect of impatience on self-reported reservation wages, on actual
re-employment wages, and on oﬀer acceptance probabilities.
Reservation wage. Between 1980 and 1986, and then again in 1994, unemployed respondents
i nt h eN L S Yw e r ea s k e d“ w h a tw o u l dt h ew a g eo rs a l a r yh a v et ob ef o ry o ut ob ew i l l i n gt ot a k e
[a job]?” We restrict our sample to males, not in school or in the military, interviewed after
1985, and we run least squares regressions of the log of the self-reported reservation wage on
the measures of impatience, and the usual set of control variables. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
6 present the estimates. The results without control variables point to a moderate negative
relationship between reservation wages and impatience. However, after inclusion of the control
variables, all the coeﬃcients but one are indistinguishable from zero, including the coeﬃcient
on the aggregate impatience measure. This result does not seem to depend on low power, since
the estimates are quite precise. We can compare these results with the reservation wage eﬀect
of standard measures of ability and human capital. These variable have a large and signiﬁcant
eﬀect: for example, 4 years of education raise the reservation wage by 23 percent, and a move
from the bottom quartile to the top quartile in previous wages raises the reservation wage by
44 percent.
Re-employment wages. The human capital explanation predicts also a negative correlation
between the impatience measures and the actual wage on the ﬁrst job after unemployment.
Re-employment wages are available in 88% of the spells used in the exit rate regressions. We
run least squares regressions of the log of re-employment wages on the measures of impatience,
and the usual set of control variables. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 present the estimates.
The results conﬁrm the above ﬁndings. After inclusion of the control variables, the aggregate
25impatience measure is not signiﬁcantly related to the re-employment wage. The individual
impatience measures are for the most part insigniﬁcant, with the exceptions of propensity to
smoke and not to have a life insurance (negative correlation) and propensity to be impatient
(positive correlation). On the other hand, measures of human capital display mostly a large
and signiﬁcant eﬀect: for example, moving from one end to the other of the interquartile range
of previous wages raises the re-employment wage by 30%.
The orthogonality between impatience and the reservation wage on one hand, and between
impatience and the re-employment wage on the other hand, lends support to the hyperbolic
model against the human capital and the exponential discounting explanations.
Acceptance probability. According to the exponential model, impatience should have a
strong positive correlation with the probability of accepting a job oﬀer. If the measures are
capturing human capital, we expect a negative correlation.25 F i n a l l y ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h eh y p e r -
bolic model, we should observe essentially no correlation. The 1981 wave of the NLSY provides
information on acceptance and rejection decisions of unemployed workers. We run a probit
model for the acceptance probability, conditional on receipt of a job oﬀer, as a function of the
impatience proxies. The mean acceptance probability is equal to 0.54. Columns 5 and 6 of
Table 6 show that the acceptance probability increases by 13 percentage points for two stan-
dard deviation increases in the aggregate impatience measure with no controls, and by only
2 percentage points after including the control variables. The lack of a signiﬁcant correlation
between acceptance probabilities and impatience is consistent with the hyperbolic model. The
results should however be taken with caution because the sample size is small, workers are
very young, and most of the impatience proxies are measured after 1981.
Is the self-reported reservation wage meaningful? The lack of correlation between
self-reported reservation wages and the impatience measures could be due to noisiness in the
reservation wage measure. Alternatively, it’s possible that, in deciding which jobs to accept,
workers do not adopt an optimal rule, but instead use a rule of thumb, such as using the
previous wage. In response to these concerns, we document three related facts. First, the
self-reported reservation wage used in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 coincides with the previous
wage for only 11 percent of the respondents, and is within 20 percent of the previous wage
for barely half of the respondents. More importantly, the self-reported reservation wage is
correlated with important economic variables in the direction predicted by job search theory.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 show that reservation wages are positively correlated (t statistic
1.61) with a dummy for unemployment beneﬁt receipt, and negatively correlated with the
25See Section 5.3. We interpret human capital changes as changes in mean productivity µ.
26local unemployment rate, even after controlling for the previous wage. The stated reservation
wage therefore responds to incentives in the way a job search model would predict. Finally,
in Column 3 we show that the self-reported reservation wage is an important predictor for the
actual re-employment wage, even after controlling for the worker’s previous wage. Overall,
self-reported reservation wages appear to reﬂect important aspects of the worker’s job search
strategy. This strengthens the signiﬁcance of the above results on impatience and reservation
wages.
5.2 Is search a channel?
Search intensity. One of the main predictions of the model is that more impatient individuals
search less intensively; in fact, if individuals are heterogeneous in short-term discounting, the
search eﬀect should be strong enough to dominate the reservation wage eﬀect. Therefore, if
variation in short-run impatience is driving the results, we expect to observe a strong empirical
link between impatience and search eﬀort. As a measure of search intensity, we use information
in the NLSY on the number of diﬀerent search methods used by unemployed workers. The
average number of methods used is 1.17. Details of the search measure are given in Appendix
Table 2.
In Table 8 we present the results for Poisson regressions of search intensity on the impatience
measures.26 T h es i m p l ec o r r e l a t i o n sb e t w e e nt h ei m p a t i e n c em e a s u r e sa n dt h ee x i tr a t ea r e
strongly negative. This negative relationship is strongest for the NLSY assessment of im-
patience and for contraceptive use. The inclusion of control variables renders some of the
impatience measures insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the overall sign pattern indicates a
consistent negative eﬀect of impatience on search intensity. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients
is again important: a two standard deviation diﬀerence in the aggregate impatience measure
is associated with a 17 percent increase in the number of search methods used. This eﬀect is
similar in magnitude to the eﬀect of human capital variables: 4 years of education raise search
eﬀort by 21 percent.
Eﬀects of search and reservation wages on the exit rate. We now investigate whether
the correlations between search eﬀort and the exit rate, and between reservation wages and
the exit rate can shed light on the form of intertemporal preferences. If workers diﬀer in their
(partially unobservable) degree of short-run patience β, but are otherwise homogeneous, then
we should observe a strong positive correlation between search eﬀo r ta n dt h ee x i tr a t e .A l le l s e
26We also estimated the model by OLS and the results did non diﬀer substantially.
27equal, workers with a high degree of short-run patience (high β)s e a r c hm o r ei n t e n s i v e l ya n d
exit more frequently than their impatient counterparts (low β workers). On the other hand, we
expect essentially no correlation between reservation wages and the exit rate since variation in
β has only a small eﬀect on reservation wages. Consider now the exponential model. If workers
diﬀer in their degree of long run patience δ, both correlations should be negative: patient (high
δ) workers search more intensively and have higher reservation wages. Since the reservation
wage eﬀect dominates, they have lower exit rates.
We link search eﬀort and reservation wages for workers who were unemployed at the time of
the NLSY interview with the subsequent duration of unemployment spells. Table 9 presents
the correlation between search eﬀort and the exit rate, and between the reservation wage and
the exit rate using a Cox proportional hazard model. Search eﬀort, as measured by the number
of diﬀerent methods of search used, is strongly positively correlated with the exit rate: the exit
rate increases by 9 to 12 percent for every additional method of search used. On the other hand,
the correlation between reservation wages and the exit rate is essentially indistinguishable from
zero: a 10 percent increase in the reservation wage lowers the exit rate by only 0.4 percent
in the model with controls. Once again, the empirical ﬁndings suggest that the impatience
measures capture short-run discounting for hyperbolic agents.
5.3 Other potential explanations
The ﬁrst row of Table 10 summarizes the empirical results. The impatience measures are neg-
atively correlated with exit rates from unemployment and with search eﬀort. In addition, they
are essentially orthogonal to reservation wages and acceptance probability. These results are
consistent with a model of heterogeneity in short-run discounting (variation in β), and incon-
sistent with a model of heterogeneity in long-run discounting (variation in δ). Furthermore,
heterogeneity in human capital (variation in the location of the wage distribution µ)d o e sn o t
seem to explain the results. We now review four other interpretations of the impatience proxies
that could potentially rationalize the empirical ﬁndings.
The measures of impatience may be capturing a high taste for leisure – consider, for instance,
frequency of hangover – or low search productivity, as may be the case for impatience during
the interview. The measures may also reﬂect bad attitudes of workers that translate into a
narrow set of potential wage oﬀers, or high layoﬀ probabilities: smoking and alcohol consump-
tion are two examples. We therefore study the eﬀect on job search outcomes of variation in
the utility of leisure b, the productivity of search λ27, the dispersion σ (as measured by mean
27We denote by s the search eﬀort and by λs the resulting probability of ﬁnding a job in any period. Increases
28preserving spreads) of the wage distribution, and the probability of layoﬀ q.
The bottom part of Table 10 summarizes the comparative statics results with respect to these
variables.28 Ad e ﬁnite sign indicates an eﬀect of known direction. A sign in parenthesis
indicates that, although the eﬀect is a priori ambiguous, a broad set of simulations yields a
consistent sign.
We ﬁrst test the leisure explanation. High utility of leisure b is associated with high reservation
wages. Individuals that enjoy spare time require a high wage in order to go back to work. This
contrasts with the empirical ﬁnding of no signiﬁcant eﬀect of our measures of impatience on
the reservation wage. Similarly, the data reject also the alternative story that individuals have
both lower human capital µ and higher utility of leisure b. If this were true, we should ﬁnd
that higher impatience measures are associated with lower acceptance probability, against our
ﬁndings of zero correlation (and positive correlation without controls).
The other three stories have similar implications. Individuals with low productivity of search λ,
low dispersion of wage oﬀers σ, or high probability of layoﬀ q exhibit both low search eﬀort and
low reservation wages. The search eﬀect, however, is second order relative to the reservation
wage eﬀect, so that these individuals have a higher exit rate, contrary to our empirical ﬁndings.
The intuition for these results is clear. In general, the reservation wage eﬀect prevails since
even small diﬀerences in future wages have a larger impact on lifetime utility than a diﬀerence
of a week or two in the length of the unemployment spell. The exception to this pattern is
the response to short-run impatience, since in this case only the trade-oﬀ between today and
tomorrow matters.
In conclusion, variation in the short-run impatience parameter β can explain in a uniﬁed man-
ner all of the empirical correlations, while other economic explanations have diﬃculties in
rationalizing at least one ﬁnding. It is still possible that the proxies are capturing a combi-
nation of the above stories, so that the global eﬀect mirrors that predicted by variation in β.
Nevertheless, the parsimony of this explanation lends it considerable appeal.
in productivity are associated with higher probabilities of ﬁn d i n gaj o bf o rg i v e ns e a r c he ﬀort. Increases in
productivity may occur because ﬁrms are more interested in hiring workers which do not display impatient
behavior.
28The results are straightforward and can be obtained along the lines of Proposition 3. A set of proofs as well
as simulations can be obtained from the authors upon request. Interestingly, none of the results depend on the
form of intertemporal preferences.
295.4 A calibration
So far we have argued that the qualitative eﬀects of impatience on job search outcomes are best
explained by variation of short-run discounting for individuals with hyperbolic time preferences.
Can we also match the magnitudes of the eﬀects? We present a simple calibration in the
bottom panel of Table 1 to address this question. We assume that workers are either patient
or impatient and that patient workers have exponential preferences with yearly discount factor
δ equal to 0.95. We take as given the empirical diﬀerential in exit rates between patient and
impatient workers, and then compute the value of β for impatient workers that matches this
diﬀerential.29
The calibration provides reasonable estimates on two accounts. First, the estimates of the
short-run discount factor βimp are mostly close to 0.9, a value compatible with the experimental
evidence of time preferences.30 Second, the calibrated acceptance probabilities for the patient
and the hyperbolic impatient worker are (almost) identical. This follows from Proposition 2
— the reservation wage eﬀect for hyperbolic individuals is either null (na¨ ıves) or very close to
zero (sophisticates). This theoretical result ﬁts nicely with the empirical ﬁndings in Section
5.1: the measures of impatience are orthogonal to the probability of acceptance.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have addressed theoretically and assessed empirically the eﬀects of impatience
on job search. Within a model with endogenous search eﬀort and a reservation wage decision,
diﬀerences in impatience have two eﬀects. More impatient individuals search less intensively
and set a lower reservation wage. The eﬀect of impatience on the exit rate depends on the
relative strength of the two contrasting forces: lower search implies lower exit rates, while a
lower reservation wage implies higher exit rates.
If individuals diﬀer in the exponential discount rate, then for suﬃciently patient individuals
the reservation wage eﬀect is stronger than the search eﬀect. Therefore workers with higher
discount rates exit unemployment faster. Instead, if individuals have hyperbolic preferences
and diﬀer in the short-run discount rate, the search eﬀect dominates, and more impatient
29The average exit rate for individuals with average characteristics in the top quartile of the aggregate im-
patience measure (see Section 3.2) is 0.0604. The average exit rate for individuals in the bottom quartile is
0.0781.
30For example, our calibration of a hyperbolic discounting model to the experimental results in Benzion,
Rapoport and Yagil (1989) yields estimates of a weekly β ranging between 0.85 and 0.96.
30workers exit unemployment later. Therefore, the correlation between impatience and the exit
rate should be positive if individuals diﬀer in the exponential discount rate, but should be
negative if individuals have hyperbolic preferences and they diﬀer in the short-term discount
factor. The latter ﬁnding would suggest that at least individuals with higher measured impa-
tience have hyperbolic time preferences. The two hypotheses also make predictions about the
magnitude of the eﬀe c to fi m p a t i e n c eo ns e a r c he ﬀort, reservation wages, and reemployment
wages.
In the empirical section, we ﬁnd that, even after controlling for a large set of background
characteristics, measures of impatience are negatively correlated with the exit rate. The size
of the eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant and comparable to that of human capital variables.
The impatience measures are also negatively correlated with search intensity. The eﬀect on
reservation wages, re-employment wages, and acceptance probability is essentially zero. The
latter result suggests that the impatience measures are not capturing exclusively unobservable
human capital. Similarly, the impatience proxies do not appear to reﬂect heterogeneity in
any other single parameter of the model. The combined evidence supports the view that
impatience has a large eﬀect on job search outcomes in the direction predicted by the hyperbolic
discounting model.
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,w er e c o g n i z et h a tt h e r ec a nb ea l t e r native explanations for our empirical results.
F i r s t ,t h ei m p a t i e n c ep r o x i e sa r ea d m i t t e d l yi m p erfect. While no single alternative interpreta-
tion of these proxies ﬁts all the results, these proxies may capture a combination of variables
(such as taste for leisure, human capital, and search cost) that overall can explain our results.
Second, there is substantial measurement error in job search variables such as self-reported
reservation wages. Unfortunately, this reduces the precision of the conclusions that can be
drawn from the results. Finally, the model makes simplifying assumptions such as lack of on
the job search and inability to borrow. It will be interesting to consider in the future whether
removing some of these assumptions can bring the standard model closer to ﬁtting the data.
Overall, we hope that this paper stimulates interest in the role of intertemporal preferences in
the job search process, and that future research addresses the open questions above.
The empirical support for hyperbolic time preferences has implications for labor market poli-
cies. For hyperbolic workers the diﬀerence between desired and actual search eﬀort can be
substantial. This identiﬁes a new channel through which job search programs can operate, by
reducing the short-term costs that undermine the success of search. In particular, direct assis-
tance that forces the worker to go through the most unpleasant steps of the search process is
likely to be beneﬁcial. The evidence from randomized job search experiments seems supportive
31of this hypothesis: according to Meyer (1995), the most successful programs were characterized
by direct involvement of the workers. Another potentially eﬀective policy is one that closely
monitors workers’ search behavior (Paserman, 2004). The evidence on the actual eﬀectiveness
of such policies is mixed (Ashenfelter et al., 1999; van den Berg et al., 2004).
The results have also implications for the behavior of ﬁrms. In a labor market populated by
hyperbolic workers, proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms should oﬀer a signing bonus to job applicants:
the immediate cash payment would oﬀset the short-run search costs and constitute a strong
incentive for workers to accept the job. Firms could make up for the additional costs by
reducing the level of wages. Additionally, ﬁrms may try to reduce the direct costs of ﬁling
applications. Large retailers in the United States have set up interactive kiosks where potential
job applicants can submit their r´ esum´ es and schedule interviews at low cost. If modest costs
represent a barrier to search for hyperbolic workers, then streamlining of the job application
process may induce them to search more.
32A Appendix A: Mathematical Section
Deﬁne Q(x) ≡
R x
x (u − x)dF (u). We introduce the following technical assumptions:
A1. Bounded discount factor δ.T h e r ee x i s t saδ such that δ ≤ δ<1.
A2. Conditions on search costs. We assume c0 (0) <β δ Q(b)/(1 − δ(1 − q)) <c 0 (1).
A3. Low utility of leisure. We require b<x.
Deﬁnition 1 A Markov strategy for self t is a choice of (st,w∗
t) ∈ [0,1] × R+.
The following Proposition characterizes Markov perfect equilibria for a sophisticated agent (an
exponential individual is a particular case with β =1 ) .
Proposition A.1 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium) The sequence {(σt,ω∗
t)}t≥0 of Markov strate-
gies is a Markov perfect equilibrium for a sophisticated agent with impatience parameters β and
δ if and only if there exists a sequence of continuation payoﬀs {V U
t }t≥0 such that
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and the continuation payoﬀ satisﬁes
V U
t = b − c(σt)+
δ
1 − δ(1 − q)
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for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove (9). Using iterated substitution of V E
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+l i m
T→∞
δT (1 − q)
T V E
t+T(w). (12)
Given the assumption of bounded per-period payoﬀs, the last term is equal to 0. In a Markov
perfect equilibrium, it is easy to see that the optimal acceptance policy is a reservation wage
strategy. The worker accepts any oﬀer higher than the reservation wage ω∗
t, which is deﬁned
as the wage w that equates V U
t+1 and V E
t+1(w). This generates expression (9). Consider now
expression (10): the maximization problem in (2) can be rewritten as















Using expression (12) for V E
t+1(w) and the identity 1 − F(x)=
R ¯ x
x dF(u), it follows that




















33Expression (10) follows substituting for the value of V U
t+1 from (9). As for (11), this is just the
continuation payoﬀ for self t − 1f r o mp e r i o dt on. Finally, by strict convexity of c(·),ω ∗
t and
σt are uniquely deﬁned for a given {V U
s }s≥t+1.
The next Proposition characterizes Markov perfect equilibria for a na¨ ıve agent.
Proposition A.2 The sequence {(σn
t ,ωn∗
t )}t≥0 of Markov strategies is a Markov perfect equi-
librium for a naive agent with impatience parameters β and δ if and only if, given the Markov
perfect equilibrium solution {(σe
t,ωe∗
t )}t≥0 and the associated continuation payoﬀ {V
U,e
t }t≥0 for
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P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .We prove the result for sophisticated agents (for the exponential case,
set β = 1). The equilibrium for na¨ ıve agents can be easily characterized along the lines of
Proposition A.2 using the equilibrium strategies for an exponential agent. By the stationarity
assumption, V U
t+s = V U for all s ≥ 1. Therefore, expressions (9) and (10) simplify to
ω∗
t =( 1 − δ)V U,




1 − δ(1 − q)
£
(1 − δ(1 − q))V U + sQ
¡
(1 − δ)V U¢¤
.
Deﬁne B =[ b1,b 2] ⊂ R where b1 ≡ b/(1 − δ)a n db2 ≡ b1+δQ(b)/[(1 − δ)(1− δ (1 − q))] ≥ b1.
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We introduce and prove a Claim regarding Λ that we use below.
Claim 1. The function Λ(·)d e ﬁned by (13) and (14) maps B into B.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 .We ﬁrst prove Λ
¡
V U¢
≥ b1 for V U ≥ b1. Consider the functions D(s) ≡
−c(s)+sδQ
£
(1 − δ)V U¤
/(1 − δ(1 − q)) and B(s) ≡− c(s)+sβδQ
£
(1 − δ)V U¤
/(1 − δ(1 −
q)). Clearly, D(s) ≥ B(s) for all s ∈ [0,1]. Notice that σ(V U) = argmaxs∈[0,1] B (s). Since
B(0) = 0 and s = 0 can always be chosen, B(σ(V U)) ≥ 0b yo p t i m a l i t yo fσ(V U). Therefore,






b1 +0 , which is what we wanted to prove.
We now prove that Λ
¡
V U¢
≤ b2 for V U ≤ b2.B y ∂Λ(V U)/∂V U ≤ δ and Λ(b1) ≤ b1 +
δQ(b)/(1 − δ(1 − q)), we can derive Λ
¡
V U¢
≤ b1 + δV U + δQ(b)/(1 − δ(1 − q)) ≡ L(V U).
34In order to ﬁnd the upper bound b2,w es o l v et h ee q u a t i o nL(b2)=b2 which yields b2 =
b1+δQ(b)/[(1 − δ)(1− δ(1 − q))] >b 1. This implies Λ
¡
V U¢
≤ L(V U) ≤ b2 for every V U ∈ B,
which is the second desired bound.
A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium satisﬁes Λ
¡
V U¢
= V U. Hence, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the set of stationary Markov perfect equilibria and the ﬁxed points of
the function Λ(·). We now prove that a ﬁxed point of Λ(·) exists and is unique. We ﬁrst show
dΛ(V )/dV U ≤ δ<1. By strict convexity and diﬀerentiability of c(·), and absolute continuity
of the wage oﬀer distribution F (·), Λ(·)i sad i ﬀerentiable function of V U. Diﬀerentiating (14)
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(16)
w h e r ew eu s eQ0 (x)=−(1 − F (x)). Since ∂σ(V U)/∂V U is negative and ∂Λ(V U)/∂σ(V U)i s
positive, dΛ(V U)/dV U ≤ δ<1.
Claim 1 proves that Λ(·)m a p sB into B. Hence, Λ(·) is a continuous function from a compact
subset of R into itself. This implies that Λ(·) has at least one ﬁxed point. Moreover, since
dΛ(V U)/dV U ≤ δ<1, such ﬁxed point is unique for V ⊆ B. Finally, it is easy to see that
V U <b 1 implies Λ
¡
V U¢
>VU and that V U >b 2 implies Λ
¡
V U¢
<VU.T h e r e f o r e ,n oo t h e r




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Consider the expression maximized in (13), which is the net
present utility U of all the selves of a sophisticated hyperbolic agent (recall that the setting is
stationary). Consider the eﬀect of a marginal deviation of the search level from the optimal
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[1 − F((1 − δ)V U)]
¸
where the ﬁrst term is 0 by the ﬁrst order condition and the second term is positive since
∂V U/∂s > 0, as shown in (15). Therefore, a small increase in the search eﬀort increases U.
The comparative statics results for the sophisticated worker follow from straightforward diﬀer-
entiation of the system of implicit equations deﬁning the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
(see Proposition A.1):
0=w∗ + c(s) − b −
δs




1 − δ(1 − q)
Q(w∗). (17)
35Proof of Proposition 2 (Search and reservation wage). ( a )T h es y s t e ma b o v ey i e l d st h e
following result for sophisticated individuals (and therefore for exponential individuals when
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where
C−1 =( 1− β)
βδ2 (1 − F (w∗))




δs(1 − F (w∗))
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¶
> 0.
Similarly, (b) and (c) for sophisticated agents yield
dw∗
dβ
= C (1 − β)
µ
δ
1 − δ(1 − q)
¶2
Q(w∗)
2 ≥ 0a n d
dw∗
dβ
> 0f o rβ<1,
dw∗
dδ
= Cβ(1 − β)
δQ(w∗)
2
(1 − δ(1 − q))
3 + C
sc00 (s)
(1 − δ(1 − q))
2Q(w∗) > 0. (19)
The proofs of (a), (b) and (c) for na¨ ıve agents are a straightforward consequence of equations
(6) and (7) in the text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3( β impatience). Part (a) is a straightforward consequence of
Proposition 2. For Part (b),
dh
dβ






= C [1 − F (w∗)]
µ
1+
δs(1 − F (w∗))
1 − δ(1 − q)
¶µ
δ













1 − δ(1 − q)
"
[1 − F (w∗)] +
δs[1 − F (w∗)]
2
1 − δ(1 − q)
µ
1 − (1 − β)
f (w∗)Q(w∗)
[1 − F (w∗)]
2
¶#
and the result follows from the observation that
∂






1 − F (w∗)
=
f (w∗)Q(w∗)
[1 − F (w∗)]
2.
Log-concavity of W is a suﬃcient condition for Proposition 3 to hold, since it implies 0 ≤
∂
∂w∗E (W | W>w ∗) ≤ 1, a result originally proved by Chamberlain and shown in Heckman
and Honor´ e (1990).
Recall the deﬁnitions η(s) ≡ sc00(s)/c0 (s), and ψ(w) ≡ f(w)/(1 − F (w)).
36P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4( δ impatience). We ﬁrst show the result for sophisticated hyper-
bolic workers. Using (18) and (19), we get
dh
dδ







=[ 1 − F (w∗)]C
β
(1 − δ(1 − q))
2Q(w∗)+
−sf (w∗)Cβ(1 − β)
δQ(w∗)
2
(1 − δ(1 − q))
3 − C
c00(s)s2f (w∗)
(1 − δ(1 − q))
2Q(w∗)=
=
CQ(w∗)[1− F (w∗)]sc0 (s)
(1 − δ(1 − q))
2
"
1/[w∗ − b + c(s)]+
−(1 − β)ψ(w∗) − ψ(w∗)η(s)
#
(20)
where in the last equation we use the ﬁrst order condition for search (17) and
c0 (s)s = β (w∗ − b + c(s)).
The strategy of the proof is to show that there exists a ¯ q>0 such that for q ∈ [0, ¯ q] the second
and third term dominate over the ﬁrst for δ close to 1; therefore, the exit rate is eventually
decreasing in δ.
Deﬁne s(q,δ) the search level chosen for layoﬀ parameter q and long-run patience δ. Consider
a discount factor δ < 1 such that s ≡ s(0,δ) > 0. Its existence is ensured by the conditions
guaranteeing interior solutions.
Claim 1. There exists a level w with (x + b)/2 < w<x such that, for s>sand w>w,
ψ(w)η(s) > 1/[w − b + c(s)].
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the function η(s)=sc00 (s)/c0 (s). The properties c0 > 0a n dc00 > 0
imply that η is positive and bounded away from 0 for s>s : there exists an η > 0 such that
η(s) ≥ η for s>s . Turning to ψ(w)=f(w)/(1 − F(w)), we can observe that, as w converges
to x, F(w) converges to 1 and therefore, since f>0, the failure rate ψ(w)d i v e r g e st o+ ∞.
Therefore, using the fact that ψ(w) can be made arbitrarily large, we know there exists a
e w<x such that, for s>sand w>e w, ψ(w)η(s) >ψ(w)η > 2/(x − b). W ec a nt h e nt a k e
w =m a x ( e w,(x + b)/2) to conclude that, for s>sand w>w, ψ(w)η(s) > 2/(x − b) >
1/[w − b + c(s)] (we use the fact that, for w>(x + b)/2, w − b + c(s) >w− b>(x − b)/2).
Q.E.D.
Claim 2. There exist a ¯ q>0a n daδ∗ satisfying δ <δ ∗ < 1 such that both w∗(q,δ) > w and
s(q,δ) >shold for δ ≥ δ∗.
Proof. A straightforward consequence of equation (11) is that
Q(w∗(q,δ)) =
1 − δ(1 − q)
δs(q,δ)
(w∗(q,δ) − b + c(s(q,δ))).
For ﬁxed q>0 the fraction (1 − δ(1 − q))/δs(q,δ) converges to q/s(q,δ)a sδ → 1. Therefore,
for δ =1 , we have Q(w∗(q,1)) = (w∗(q,1) − b + c(s(q,1))) · q/s(q,1) ≤ (x − b + C) · q/s(q,1)
where C = c(1). Moreover, one can prove that s(q,1) is a decreasing function of q and therefore
that q/s(q,1) is an increasing function of q. Therefore, by choosing a layoﬀ probability q close
to 0, it is possible to make q/s(q,1) arbitrarily small. It follows that we can pick a q>0s u c h
that both (x − b + C) · q/s(q,1) <Q (w)a n ds(q,1) >s . By the above chain of inequalities,
37Q(w∗(q,1)) <Q (w). We know that Q(w∗(q,δ)) is a decreasing and continuous function of δ,
since Q is decreasing and continuous in its argument and w∗ is increasing and continuous in δ;
moreover, s is continuous in δ. Therefore, there will be a discount factor δ∗ with δ <δ ∗ < 1t h a t
guarantees that, for δ ≥ δ∗,b o t hQ(w∗(¯ q,δ)) <Q (w)a n ds(q,δ) >shold. By monotonicity
of Q we obtain w∗(q,δ) > w, which is what we wanted to prove. Q.E.D.
Claim 3. There exist a ¯ q>0a n daδ∗ satisfying δ <δ ∗ < 1 such that both w∗(q,δ) > w and
s(q,δ) >shold for δ ≥ δ∗ and q ≤ q.
Proof. This fact can be established along the same lines of Claim 2, using the property that
q/s(q,δ) is an increasing function of q. Q.E.D.
Claim 1 and Claim 3 together establish that there exists a q>0a n ds o m eδ∗ < 1 such that,
for q ≤ ¯ q and δ ≥ δ∗, the expression in brackets in (20) is negative. Therefore, for q ≤ ¯ q
and δ ≥ δ∗, ∂h/∂δ is negative. This proves the Proposition for the sophisticated individuals,
including exponential individuals as a special case. The proof for a na¨ ıve individual follows
from the observation that wn∗ (β,δ)=we∗ (δ).
In order to prove (b), recall from Proposition 2 that s and w∗ are increasing in δ. Under
the assumption that both ψ and η are increasing functions, the bracketed term in (20) is a
decreasing function of δ. Consider also that the exit rate is 0 for δ = 0 since the optimal search
in this case is 0. Therefore, for δ small enough the exit rate must be increasing in δ. Combining
this argument with part (a), we obtain the desired conclusion.
B Appendix B: Data Description and Variable Construction
Unemployment Spells in the PSID. Our sample is similar to the one in Katz (1986)
and Katz and Meyer (1990). Between 1981 and 1983, PSID heads of household were asked
to provide detailed information on the length and on other characteristics of up to three
unemployment spells contained at least in part in the previous calendar year. For every
individual, we consider only the last unemployment spell mentioned at each interview. An
unemployment spell makes it into our sample only if the respondent was a male head of
household, between 20 and 65 years of age at the time of the interview. In order to maximize
sample size, we retain more than one unemployment spell per individual when it is possible to
determine with certainty (using self-reported information on the year the spell began) that a
given spell is not the same as a previously mentioned one.
Unemployment Spells in the NLSY. We use the NLSY Work History ﬁles to construct a
week by week account of every worker’s labor force status from 1978 to 1996. At each interview,
NLSY respondents were asked to report up to 10 employers they had since the date of the last
interview (only 5 employers were retained in the public use ﬁl e s ) ,u pt o6p e r i o d si nw h i c h
they were not working between jobs (between-job non-employment spells), and up to 4 periods
during their tenure with one employer in which they were temporarily not working (within-job
non-employment spells). For each non-employment spell (both between-job and within-job),
respondents were asked whether they looked for work during all of the period, during part of
the period, or whether they did not look at all. Our benchmark measure of unemployment
spells is constructed by assigning an “unemployed” code to every week in a non-employment
spell during which at least some search took place; workers who did not look for work because
they believed that no work was available were also labeled as unemployed. In Section 4.3 we
use a narrower deﬁnition of unemployment: a worker is unemployed only in the weeks that
38actual search took place.
Search Intensity. Between 1980 and 1993, workers who were unemployed at the time of the
NLSY interview were asked which methods of search they had used in the past 4 weeks (see
Appendix Table 2 for the list of methods). Consistently with the ﬁndings of previous studies,
the most popular methods are direct contact with employers, looking up ads in newspapers,
contact with the state employment service, and contact with friends and relatives. Our measure
of search intensity is constructed by simply counting the number of diﬀerent search methods
u s e d ,a n da s s i g n i n gav a l u eo fz e r ot ot h o s ew h or e p o r t e dh a v i n gd o n e“ n o t h i n g ”t oﬁnd a job,
and to those who were classiﬁed as out of the labor force by the NLSY, but declared that they
“would want a job now, either full or part-time.” The results are not sensitive to the inclusion
of this latter category. In the regressions, we restrict our sample to male workers, neither in
school nor in the military, interviewed after 1985.
Reservation Wage. We use data on self-reported reservation wages for select years in the
NLSY. Between 1980 and 1986, and then again in 1994, unemployed respondents who were
looking for work were asked “what would the wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to
take [the job].” We restrict our sample to male workers, neither in school nor in the military,
interviewed in 1985, 1986 or 1994 and use the response to this question as the measure of the
reservation wage.
Acceptance Probability. In 1981, a detailed questionnaire on search activities was adminis-
tered to NLSY subjects. Individuals were asked whether they engaged in any search activities
in the previous 4 weeks; which methods of search they used, time spent on each method, and
whether use of any of the methods resulted in a contact with employer, in a job oﬀer, and in
an accepted job oﬀer. For each method that generates a job oﬀer, we record whether the oﬀer
was accepted. To ensure that we are only focusing on search when unemployed, we restrict
attention to males, neither in school nor in the military, who are unemployed at the time of
the interview, or whose tenure at their current job is lower than four weeks.
Factor Analysis. We use factor analysis to create an aggregate measure of impatience derived
from the impatience variables. Factor analysis is designed to reproduce the correlations between
a set of observed variables (z1,..., z P) by describing them as a linear combination of a set of
common factors (F1,...,FQ, with Q usually much smaller than P) and a unique factor (Yp)f o r
each variable.
zp = ap1F1 + ap2F2 + ... + apQFQ + upYp (p =1 ,2,...,P)
The common factors account for the correlations among the variables, while each unique factor
accounts for the remaining variance of that variable. The coeﬃcients of the common factors
are frequently referred to as factor loadings.
We estimate a factor model via maximum likelihood (Harman, 1976, Chapter 10) using the
measures of impatience and report its results in Appendix Table 3. Likelihood ratio tests
indicated that four factors should be retained in the model, but it was diﬃcult to give a
meaningful interpretation to all but the ﬁrst factor. We therefore retain only the ﬁrst factor
which in the four factor model accounts for more than 50 percent of the variance: all the
loadings have a positive sign, so it seems reasonable to interpret this factor as impatience.
The uniqueness, reported in the next column, measures the percentage of the variance of
each variable that is not explained by the factors. The variables that ﬁt best the factor
model are smoking, having a bank account, and use of contraceptives, but the percentage of
unexplained variance is high for all the variables. In the last column of the Table we report the
39scoring coeﬃcients on the individual measures of impatience used to construct the aggregate
measure. The variables that receive most weight are smoking, having a bank account, and use
of contraceptives, while participation in vocational clubs receives no weight.
C Appendix C: Calibration
We adopt the following assumptions in performing the calibrations in Table 1.
Time unit. We use weekly time units for consistency with the frequency of duration data in
the PSID and the NLSY.
Wage distribution. We rely on previous studies of reservation wages in the search literature
(Lynch, 1983, van den Berg, 1990) in order to determine the shape and the central moments
of the wage oﬀer distribution. We normalize the median of the wage distribution to be equal
to 1, and then ﬁx the standard deviation of log wages at 0.19, to match the value estimated
in Lynch (1983), a representative study in this literature. We also consider a higher value of
the standard deviation, 0.35, our estimate of the NLSY within-individual standard deviation
in log weekly wages in two-year intervals. We assume that the wage oﬀer distribution is either
log-normal (in the benchmark calibration) or log-uniform (van den Berg, 1990).
Layoﬀ probability. Bowlus (1995) estimates the mean duration of an employment spell for
people that were previously unemployed to be around 90 weeks. Since layoﬀs are responsible
for approximately 40 percent of job separations (our own estimates in the NLSY), we assume
q equal to 0.4 × 1/90 = 1/225 in the benchmark calibration. We also let q equal to 1/100 to
examine the eﬀect of high layoﬀ probabilities.
Beneﬁts. We set beneﬁts b equal to 0.25, a value reﬂecting the utility of leisure as well as
social stigma for non-recipients of unemployment beneﬁts. For robustness purposes, we also
present calibrations for b equal to 0 and 0.5.
Cost function. The cost function is characterized by two main features: the curvature and
the absolute level of costs. The curvature reﬂects the extent to which increasing marginal costs
set in for increases in s and is captured by the marginal cost elasticity η(s)=sc00(s)/c0(s). We
employ a power function with constant elasticity η>0, c(s)=ks1+η.
For each combination of utility of leisure, shape and dispersion of the wage distribution, and
layoﬀ probability, the parameters k and η are calibrated so as to match the empirical exit rate
and acceptance probability of the most patient workers in the NLSY who do not receive UI
beneﬁts (i.e., workers in the bottom quartile of the distribution of the aggregate impatience
measure). For these workers, the weekly exit rate is 0.0781, and the acceptance probability is
0.54. The resulting values for k are for columns (1) to (6) in Table 1: 27.35 (benchmark case),
22.41, 36.36, 42.17, 28.23, 53.11. The corresponding values for η are: 0.40 (benchmark case),
0.23, 0.63, 0.16, 0.35, 1.38.
D Appendix D: Continuous-Time Framework
The model is written as in Flinn and Heckman (1982). In addition, we incorporate continuous-
time hyperbolic discounting. For simplicity we also assume q =0( n ol a y o ﬀ). The value
40function is written as follows:





















The continuation payoﬀ incorporates the immediate payoﬀs from unemployment beneﬁts and
cost of search. These payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned in terms of one non-inﬁnitesimal unit of time, say,
one week. Therefore, as ∆t shrinks, b and c do not change. We deﬁne s to be the fraction of
one unit of time that an agent spends searching and assume that, over a short period ∆t,t h e
probability of ﬁnding a job oﬀer is proportional to s, that is, is λs∆t for some λ>0. The costs
of searching c(s) are increasing and concave in the fraction of time spent searching. Similarly,
we deﬁne w to be the wage for one non-inﬁnitesimal time period.
The second term in expression (21) is the discounted payoﬀ for the case in which the agent
does not get a wage oﬀer and the discount function does not drop. These events occur with
probability 1 − λs∆t − γ∆t, since the probability that two distinct events occur in interval
∆t is negligible and can be written as o(∆t). The third component is the continuation payoﬀ
for the case in which the agent gets an oﬀer and the discount function does not drop. The
agent accepts oﬀers that are higher than the reservation wage ˆ w. We denote by U (x)t h e
net discounted value of an oﬀer x. T h en e x tt e r mi ne x p r e s s i o n( 2 1 )r e ﬂects the presence of
hyperbolic discounting. With probability γ∆t the discount function drops by a factor α ≤ 1
and the agent does not receive an oﬀer. If the discount function drops, the agent obtains a
continuation payoﬀ W, which is diﬀerent from V since the drop can occur only once. Notice
that if γ =0o rα = 1 we are back to the standard time-consistent discounting.
After some simpliﬁcations and after multiplying by (1 + r∆t) and simplifying V, we can rewrite
expression (21) as follows:
r∆tV =m a x
s, ˆ w




(U (x) − V )dF (x)
¸
+ γ∆tαW.
We can then simplify ∆t to get





(U (x) − V )dF (x)
¸
+ γ [αW − V ] (22)
We now solve for U and W. The continuation payoﬀ W is the continuation payoﬀ from the
point of view of the future self once the drop in discounting has already occurred. Formally,

















where s∗ and w∗ are the solutions for s and ˆ w in program (22). We solve for W to get
W =
1










41The function U (x) is the discounted value of a wage oﬀer x. The discounting function U





,t h a ti s ,t h eﬂow in U (x)e q u a l st h e
wage x∆t plus the probability γ∆t that the increased discounting occurs and the continuation







We also know that the reservation wage w∗ is deﬁned as the wage that makes the agent


















(x − w∗)dF (x)
¸
(26)
where the second equality follows from substituting the expressions for U (x)a n dV. Expression
(26) provides the solution for s∗ as a function of w∗. We now derive the second equation that
closes the model. One can solve for V from (22) to get
V =
1
r + λs∗ (1 − F (w∗)) + γ
·









and the desired equation comes from coupling this with expressions (25) for V and (23) for W.
We now consider the solution for the instantaneous discounting case (γ →∞ ). This assumption






























(x − w∗)dF (x)=w∗. (29)
Equations (28) and (29) are the equivalent of the system of equations (17), with the only
diﬀerences that α replaces β, the discount rate r replaces the discount factor δ according
to δ =1 /(1 + r), and an additional parameter λ appears in equation (28). Since we can
substitute α and r with β and δ and we can set λ =1 , we are back to the same system of
equations that deﬁnes the discrete-time framework. Given the fact that in continuous time
search eﬀort s belongs to the set [0,∞), rather than to the set [0,1], we replace Assumption
A2 with the correspondent Assumption A2’.
Assumption A2’. We assume that there exists a S>0 such that c0 (0) < (α/r)Q(b) <c 0 (S).
Given this, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 apply in the continuous-time framework as well, with an
obvious adjustment for the fact that the layoﬀ probability q equals 0.
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Figure 1a: Exit Rate and Short-Run Patience 
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Figure 1b: Exit Rate and Long-Run Patience   
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FIGURE 2: Exit Rates in the PSID 
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FIGURE 4: Nonlinearities in the Exit Rate: 
Exit Rates at 13 Weeks and Patience 
  
 
Table 1: Calibrations 
† 
            

















 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
           
1. Value of the long run discount factor δmax such that the exit rate is decreasing in δ for δ  > δmax. 
           




0.897  0.955 0.995  0.974  0.993  0.999 
           
           
           
           
2. What value of β matches the empirical differential in exit rates between patient and impatient 
workers, assuming that patient workers are exponential with δ=0.95?  
        For patient workers: δpat= 0.95, βpat = 1, exit rate = 0.0781, probability of acceptance = 0.540. 
        For impatient workers: δimp (hyperbolic) = 0.95, exit rate = 0.0604 
           
           
a. Naïve  
    Hyperbolic 
           
βimp  0.902  0.942 0.851  0.960  0.915  0.701 
            
Probability of 
acceptance  0.540  0.540 0.540  0.540  0.540  0.540 
           
b. Sophisticated 
    Hyperbolic 
           
βimp  0.886  0.933 0.825  0.954  0.902  0.640 
            
Probability of 
acceptance  0.545  0.543 0.548  0.542  0.544  0.558 
           
 
                                                           
†Notes: Benchmark parameters: utility of leisure b = 0.25; wage distribution – log-normal with location parameter µ = 0 and dispersion paramter 
σ = 0.19; probability of layoff q = 0.0044. 
Cost of search function: c(s) = ks
1+η. The parameters k and η are calibrated under each specification so as to match the exit rates and the 
acceptance probabilities of the most patient workers in the NLSY (see Appendix C for details). In the benchmark specification, k = 27.35, and 
η = 0.4025. 
  
 
Table 2: Unemployment Spells, Descriptive Statistics 
† 
      
     
     
   PSID  NLSY 
     
Number of Spells  1997 8779 
Mean Duration 
1  19.81 20.17 
Duration Distribution    
        Duration, 25th percentile  4  4 
        Median Duration  12  10 
        Duration, 75th percentile  30  25 
Spells by Individual    
        Number of individuals and mean      
        duration for individuals with:     
          1 spell  809,   21.65  849,   21.14 
          2 spells  378,   19.21  557,  22.01 
          3 spells  144,   17.42  397,  21.97 
          4 spells  -  242,  24.68 
          5 spells  -  200,  21.24 
          6 spells  -  169,  19.89 
          7 or more spells  -  299,  16.81 
       Total number of individuals  1331  2713 
Survivor Function    
         4 weeks  0.687  0.700 
         13 weeks  0.451  0.426 
         26 weeks  0.279  0.241 
         52 weeks  0.163  0.103 
         104 weeks  0.104  0.032 
Completed Spells    
        Number of completed spells  1604  8440 
        % of Total  80.32  96.14 
        % of Completed Spells:      
 Ending in a new job  50.50  79.23 
 Ending in recall  49.50  20.77 
        % of Completed Spells lasting:      
 1-4 weeks  38.97  31.03 
 5-13 weeks  29.30  28.09 
 14-26 weeks  19.51  18.63 
 27-52 weeks  9.41  13.52 
 53-104 weeks  2.56  6.48 
 105+ weeks  0.25  2.25 
 
                                                           
† Notes: For detailed explanation of the construction of the spells in the two samples, see Appendix B. 
1 Including censored spells  
 
Table 3: Measures of Impatience, Summary Statistics 
† 
      
   NLSY Sample   
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Sample: Male 
Population 
Sample: Individuals 
unemployed at least once 
during sample period 
Sample: Individuals 
unemployed at least once 
during sample period 
Sample:  
All Spells 








        
1. NLSY Assessment  0.042 0.042  0.001  -0.006 
    Measure of impatience during 
    interview 
(.114, 5518)  (.110, 2712)  (.993, 2712)  (.983, 8778) 
2. Bank Account   0.417 0.501  0.143  0.239 
    Did not have a bank account  (.493, 5187)  (.500, 2627)  (1.024, 2627)  (.1.020, 8532) 
       
3. Contraceptive Use  0.189 0.217  0.080  0.130 
    Had unprotected sex   (.358, 4053)  (.376, 2053)  (1.050, 2053)  (1.075, 6696) 
         
4. Life Insurance   0.643 0.671  0.043  0.096 
    Did not have life insurance at 
    job 
(.378, 4829)  (.370, 2365)  (.995, 2365)  (.993, 7671) 
5. Smoking  0.442 0.504  0.125  0.236 
    Smoked before unemployment 
    spells 
(.497, 5270)  (.500, 2647)  (1.007, 2647)  (1.000, 8594) 
6. Alcohol  0.262 0.289  0.035  0.029 
    Average number of hangovers 
    in past 30 days 
(.774, 5455)  (.793, 2706)  (1.025, 2706)  (.938, 8764) 
7. Vocational Clubs  0.966 0.963  -0.041 -0.079 
    Measure of non-participation 
    in vocational clubs 
(.069, 5152)  (.074, 2590)  (1.063, 2590)  (1.111, 8400) 
   PSID Sample 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Sample: Male 
Population 
Sample: Individuals 
unemployed at least once 
during sample period 
Sample: Individuals 
unemployed at least once 
during sample period 
Sample: All 
Spells 








        
1. Bank Account   0.303 0.300  -0.007 -0.001 
    Did not have a checking 
    Account 
(.460, 11762)  (.458, 940)  (.998, 940)  (1.0002, 1426) 
2. Smoking  0.334 0.560  0.477  0.474 
    Smoked before 
    unemployment spells 
(.472, 13206)  (.497, 1078)  (1.054, 1078)  (1.054. 1649) 
                                                           
† Notes: Standard deviation and number of observations in parentheses. 
The standardized measure of impatience is created by adjusting (whenever necessary) the raw measure, and standardizing the resulting measure 
so that it has mean zero and standard deviation one in the entire male population. 
  
 
Table 4: Benchmark Models 
† 
     
  NLSY Sample 
  (1) (2) 
Controls No  Yes 
    
Aggregate Impatience Measure  -0.1501** -0.089** 
  (.0159) (.0177) 
  [5664] [5664] 
    
1. NLSY Assessment of Impatience  -0.0552** -0.0431** 
    Measure of impatience during   (.0138) (.0135) 
    Interview  [8778] [8778] 
2. Bank Account   -0.135** -0.0793** 
    Did not have a bank account  (.0131) (.0141) 
  [8532] [8532] 
3. Contraceptive Use  -0.0827** -0.0243 
    Had unprotected sex   (.0141) (.0148) 
      [6696] [6696] 
4. Life Insurance   -0.0456** -0.0131 
    Did not have life insurance  (.0146) (.0150) 
    At job  [7671] [7671] 
5. Smoking  -0.0484** -0.0294** 
    Smoked before  (.0136) (.0136) 
    Unemployment spells  [8594] [8594] 
6. Alcohol  -0.0044 -0.0115 
    Average number of hangovers  (.0140) (.0140) 
    In past 30 days  [8764] [8764] 
7. Vocational Clubs  -0.0438** -0.0320** 
    Measure of non-participation   (.0130) (.0126) 
    In vocational clubs in HS  [8400] [8400] 
  PSID Sample 
Controls  No Yes 
    
1. Bank Account 
1  -0.1974** -0.1622** 
    Did not have a checking account  (.0336) (.0383) 
  [1426] [1409] 
2. Smoking  -0.1149** -0.0964** 
    Smoked before  (.0283) (.0288) 
    Unemployment spells  [1649] [1639] 
                                                           
†
Notes: Entries in the table represent the coefficient on the relevant variable from separate Cox proportional hazard models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Number of spells used in each regression is in brackets. Observations with missing values for any of the control variables were discarded. All measures of impatience 
are standardized (see Notes to Table 3). All the impatience variables (with one exception specified below) are measured prior to the occurrence of the unemployment 
spells. The aggregate impatience measure is constructed using factor analysis (see Appendix for details). 
Control Variables in the NLSY: age, education, marital status, race, dummy for kids, self-reported health status, AFQT score, father's occupation/presence (4 
dummies), parental education, received magazines while growing up, received papers, had a library card, urban dummy, SMSA dummy, central city dummy, local 
unemployment rate (5 dummies), dummy for receipt of UI benefits, region (3 dummies), 8 occupation dummies, 12 industry dummies, log (hourly wage) before  
unemployment spell, tenure on last job. 
Control variables in the PSID: age, education, race, marital status, self-reported health in 1986 (2 dummies), father's occupation (2 dummies), parental education (2 
dummies), county unemployment rate, dummy for receipt of UI benefits, 7 industry dummies, 4 occupation dummies, log (hourly wage) before the unemployment 
spell. 
1 The bank account proxy in the PSID is measured after the occurrence of the spells.  
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
† 
         
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
















Controls    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Aggregate Impatience 
Measure 
-  -0.1135** -0.0825**  - - 
     (.0285)  (.0180)    
     [1727]  [6377]     
            
            
1. NLSY Assessment  -0.0504** -0.0376* -0.0549** 0.0567** 1.1655** 
    Measure of impatience   (.0186)  (.0215)  (.0144)  (.0244)  (.4300) 
    during interview    [2712]  [10024]  F=1.61 
2. Bank Account   -0.0634** -0.0630** -0.0819** 0.0772**  0.8983** 
    Did not have a bank   (.0171)  (.0219)  (.0144)  (.0196)  (.3438) 
    Account    [2627]  [9747]  F=1.67 
3. Contraceptive Use  -0.0106 -0.0720**  -0.0268*  0.0114  0.7954** 
    Had unprotected sex   (.0159) (.0243) (.0159) (.0197) (.3602) 
        [2053]  [7618]  F=1.45 
4. Life Insurance   -0.0226 0.0054 -0.0132  0.0504**  0.9892** 
    Did not have life insurance  (.0172)  (.0224)  (.0153)  (.0195)  (.4448) 
    at job    [2365]  [8638]  F=1.24 
5. Smoking  -0.0322* -0.0369* -0.0198  0.0248  0.3092** 
    Smoked before  (.0167)  (.0210)  (.0139)  (0.0203)  (.1478) 
    unemployment spells    [2647]  [9813]  F=5.90
§ 
6. Alcohol  -0.0077 -0.0070 0.0074  0.0112 0.4026** 
    Average number of   (.0158)  (.0195)  (.0127)  (.0222)  (.1591) 
    hangovers in past 30 days    [2706]  [10006]  F=5.25
§ 
7. Vocational Clubs  -0.0343** -0.0326 -0.0436**  0.0569** 0.8780** 
    Measure of non-participation  (.0159)  (.0214)  (.0132)  (.0176)  (0.3968) 
    in vocational clubs in HS    [2590]  [9599]  F=1.56 
            
    N=5664     N=5450 N=5450 
                                                           
†
Notes: Entries in the first column represent the coefficient on the relevant variable from a single Cox proportional hazard models. Entries in columns 2 and 3 
represent coefficients on the relevant variable from separate Cox proportional hazards models. Entries in columns 4 and 5 represent the coefficient on the relevant 
variable in a regression of log completed duration on the impatience measures and the control variables. The IV estimates are obtained by instrumenting for each 
measure of impatience with all the remaining measures. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of spells used in each regression in brackets. Observations with missing values for any of the control variables were 
discarded. For the full list of control variables, see Notes to Table 4. All measures of impatience are standardized (see Notes to Table 3). All the impatience variables 
are measured prior to the occurrence of the unemployment spells. The aggregate impatience measure is constructed using factor analysis (see Appendix for details). 
*: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level. 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 




Table 6: Reservation Wage, Re-employment Wage, and Acceptance Probability 
† 
 
























  Estimation 
Method 
OLS OLS  OLS  OLS  Probit Probit 
Controls   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
            
Aggregate Impatience  -0.0711** 0.0003 -0.0898** -0.0126 0.0656*  0.0111
   (.0237)  (.0191) (.0128) (.0082) (.0376)  (.0472)
   [1010]  [1010] [5018] [5018] [161]  [161]
          
1. NLSY Assessment  -0.098 0.0107 0.0005 .0099* 0.0393  0.0294
    Measure of impatience   (.0116)  (.0099) (.0098) (.0058) (.0329)  (0.0353)
    during interview  [1675]  [1675] [7767] [7767] [230]  [230]
           
2. Bank Account   -0.0848** -0.0151 -0.0584** -0.0007 0.0673*  0.0116
    Did not have a bank  (.0182)  (.0164) (.0102) (.0065) (.0372)  (.0443)
    account    [1648]  [1648] [7555] [7555] [213]  [213]
          
3. Contraceptive Use  -0.0251* 0.0159 -0.0592** -0.0050 0.0472  0.0212
    Had unprotected sex   (.0145)  (.0126) (.0097) (.0065) (.0341)  (0.0357)
        [1283]  [1283] [5937] [5937] [181]  [181]
           
4. Life Insurance   0.0551** -0.0341** -0.0563** -0.0166** 0.0835**  .0759**
    Did not have life   (.0179)  (.0155) (.0118) (.0067) (.0336)  (.0356)
    Insurance at job  [1330]  [1330] [6789] [6789] [212]  [212]
          
5. Smoking  -0.0456** -0.0057 -0.0514 -0.0149** 0.0013  -0.0081
    Smoked before   (.0167)  (.0138) (.0107) (.0066) (.0366)  (.0398)
    unemployment spells  [1646]  [1646] [7597] [7597] [217]  [217]
          
6. Alcohol  0.0011 -0.0118 0.0064 -0.0038 -0.0196  -0.0369
    Average number of   (.0198)  (.0169) (.0094) (.0052) (.0334)  (.0344)
    hangovers in past 30 days [1604]  [1604] [7754] [7754] [226]  [226]
          
7. Vocational Clubs  0.0225 -0.0017 0.0209** 0.0027 -0.0420  -0.0301
    Measure of  (.0166)  (.0145) (.0090) (.0054) (.0318)  (0.0393)
    in vocational clubs in HS [1604]  [1604] [7426] [7426] [216]  [216]
    
    
                                                           
†
Notes: The reservation wage variable is constructed using the response to the question "what would the wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to take [a 
job]?" in the 1985, 1986 and 1994 waves of the NLSY. 
The re-employment wage is the starting real hourly wage received on the first job following the unemployment spells used in Table 4. 
The acceptance probability models are based on probit regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a job offer received using a particular 
method was accepted or not. (Data from the 1981 wave of the NLSY). The sample is restricted to unemployed males, not in school or in the military. 
 
Entries represent the coefficients on the relevant variables from separate regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, number of observations in brackets. 
Observations with missing values for any of the control variables were discarded. For the full list of control variables, see Notes to Table 4. All measures of 
impatience are standardized (see Notes to Table 3). All the impatience variables are measured prior to 1985. The aggregate impatience measure is constructed using 
factor analysis (see Appendix for details). 
*: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level. 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 
 Table 7: Is the Self-Reported Reservation Wage Meaningful?
 † 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Ln reservation wage, 1985, 
1986, 1994 
Ln reservation wage, 1985, 
1986, 1994 
Ln re-employment wage 









Local unemployment rate  






Local unemployment rate 





Local unemployment rate 

















Log reservation wage 
 
 
- -  0.237** 
(0.056) 









Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  1199  1199  779 
 
                                                 
† Notes: The reservation wage variable is constructed using the response to the question "what would the wage or salary have to be for you to be 
willing to take [a job]?" in the 1985, 1986 and 1994 waves of the NLSY. 
The re-employment wage is the starting real hourly wage received on the first job following the unemployment spells used in Table 4. 
 
Entries represent the coefficients on the relevant variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations with missing values for any of the 
control variables were discarded. For the full list of control variables, see Notes to Table 4.  
*: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level. 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 
  
 
Table 8: Search Regressions
† 
    Dependent Variable: Number of Search Methods 
Used 
    Estimation Method: Poisson 
   (1) (2) 
Controls    No Yes 
      
Aggregate Impatience Measure  -0.1188** -0.0698** 
   (.0265) (.0267) 
   [2076] [2076] 
     
     
1. NLSY Assessment  -0.0676** -.0315* 
Measure of impatience during  (.0197) (.0178) 
Interview   [3556] [3556] 
      
2. Bank Account  -0.0393* 0.0168 
Did not have a bank account  (.0224) (.0218) 
   [3475] [3475] 
     
3. Contraceptive Use  -0.0752** -0.0373* 
Had unprotected sex  (.0216) (.0210) 
  [2649] [2649] 
      
4. Life Insurance  -0.0207 -0.0140 
Did not have life insurance  (.0226) (.0222) 
at job    [2790] [2790] 
     
5. Smoking    -0.0724** -0.0277 
Smoked before  (.0220) (.0208) 
Unemployment spells  [3482] [3482] 
     
6. Alcohol    0.0014 -0.0045 
Average number of hangovers  (.0162) (.0157) 
in past 30 days  [3549] [3549] 
     
7. Vocational Clubs  -0.0045 -0.0006 
Measure of non-participation  (.0203) (.0190) 
in vocational clubs in HS  [3402] [3402] 
 
                                                           
† Notes: Entries in the table represent the coefficient on the relevant variable from separate models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations 
used in each regression is in brackets. Observations with missing values for any of the control variables were discarded. For the full list of control variables, see Table 
4. All measures of impatience are standardized (see Notes to Table 3). All the impatience variables are measured prior to the occurrence of the unemployment spells. 
*: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level. The aggregate impatience measure is constructed using factor analysis (see Appendix for details). 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 
  
 
Table 9: Search Effort, Reservation Wages, and Exit Rates
† 
 
Sample: NLSY         
Dependent Variable: Exit rate from unemployment after interview     
Estimation Method: Cox proportional hazard model   
       
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Controls No  Yes  No  Yes 
    
Search effort  0.119**  0.092**  -  - 
  (0.018) (0.019)     
Log Reservation Wage  -  -  0.185**  -0.049 
     (0.090)  (0.116) 
Duration prior to 
interview  (weeks)  -0.012**  -0.009** -0.012** -0.013** 
  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of 
Observations 1931  1931 658  658 
 
                                                           
† Notes: Search effort is measured by the number of different search methods used by unemployed workers in the four weeks prior to the NLSY interview, for all 
waves of the NLSY from 1985 to 1993 (see Appendix Table 3 for details).  
The reservation wage variable is constructed using the response to the question "what would the wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to take [a job]?" in the 
1985, 1986, and 1994 waves of the NLSY. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations with missing values for any of the control variables were discarded. For the full list of control variables, see Table 
5. 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 
  
 
Table 10: What are the Impatience Measures Capturing?
† 
      
Dependent Variable: Search Reservation  Probability     
  Effort  Wage  of Acceptance  Exit rate 
Sign of the Empirical Relationship 
Between the Dependent Variable and 
the Impatience Measures 
- (0) (0)  - 
Sign of the Change in the Dependent Variable Predicted by Changes in Various Model Parameters 
 Decrease in β (Short Run Patience)   - -/0
1 +/0
2 - 
      
 Decrease in δ (Long Run Patience)  -  -  +  + 
 Shift left in µ (Location of the Wage 
Distribution) 
-  -  - - 
      
 Increase in b (Utility of Leisure)  -  + -  - 
 Decrease in λ (Productivity of Search)  -
3 -  +  (+) 
 Decrease in σ (Dispersion of the Wage 
Distribution) 
- - (+)  (+) 
 Increase in q (Probability of Layoff)  - -  + (+) 
                                                           
† Notes: The signs in the Table indicate the predicted effect of a change in the parameter in the specified direction on job search outcomes. A sign in parenthesis indicates that the effect is ambiguous, 
but simulations point to the effect going consistently in one direction. Shaded areas correspond to predictions that are at odds with the empirical findings. 
1 The effect of a decrease in β on the reservation wage is negative for sophisticated workers, and null for naive workers. 
2 The effect of a decrease in β on the probability of acceptance is positive for sophisticated workers, and null for naive workers. 
3 For given search effort s, the probability of finding a job is λs. Under this parameterization, decreases in productivity of search lower the amount of search effort. Alternative parameterizations may 
yield different results.  
Appendix Table 1: Coefficient Estimates in NLSY Models
† 
                
  Exit rate regressions  Search regressions, OLS    Reservation Wage 
Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) (8) (9) 
  Mean  Coef.   Std. Err. Mean  Coef.   Std. Err.   Mean  Coef.   Std. Err.
Aggregate Impatience Measure  0.310  -0.0890 0.0177  0.588 -0.0837 0.0328  0.477 0.000 0.019
Education 11.876  0.0083 0.0110  11.551 0.0535 0.0215   11.653 0.054  0.013
Age 28.305  -0.0207 0.0041  27.863 -0.0118 0.0095   26.357 0.012  0.010
Married 0.332  0.1931 0.0427  0.234 -0.0013 0.1050  0.248 -0.018 0.084
Any Kids  0.325  0.0008 0.0404  0.260 0.1533 0.0996  0.237 -0.004 0.084
Black 0.317  -0.2090 0.0466  0.467 -0.0550 0.0858  0.380 -0.108 0.048
Hispanic 0.184  -0.0571 0.0584  0.160 -0.1022 0.1027  0.183 -0.035 0.058
Bad Health  0.062  -0.5078 0.0670  0.137 -0.7000 0.0775  0.101 -0.061 0.091
Received UI Benefits  0.232  -0.3313 0.0300  0.176 0.4862 0.0868  0.129 0.047 0.048
Urban Residence  0.776  -0.0754 0.0525  0.819 0.2167 0.1039  0.793 0.108 0.082
Non-SMSA  Dummy  0.266 Omitted 0.224 Omitted   0.261 Omitted
SMSA Dummy 0.560  -0.0718 0.0511  0.542 -0.0910 0.1048  0.530 -0.049 0.067
Central City Dummy  0.174  -0.1731 0.0615  0.234 -0.1308 0.1293  0.209 -0.024 0.079
Local Unemployment rate: 0 - 2.9 % 0.009  Omitted 0.013 Omitted   0.000  Omitted
Local Unemployment rate: 3.0 - 5.9% 0.343  0.1727 0.1295  0.305 -0.1169 0.2176  0.217 0.073 0.082
Local Unemployment rate: 6.0 - 8.9% 0.396  0.0395 0.1290  0.417 -0.1633 0.2259  0.411 0.041 0.075
Local Unemployment rate: 9.0 - 11.9%  0.164  0.0063 0.1338  0.171 -0.0542 0.2386  0.212 -0.033 0.085
Local Unemployment rate: 12.0 - 14.9%  0.073  -0.1056 0.1434  0.077 -0.1455 0.2551  0.124 -0.023 0.077
Local Unemployment rate: 15.0% + 0.015  0.0002 0.1674  0.016 0.0737 0.3106  0.036 Omitted
Region:  South  0.208 Omitted 0.216 Omitted   0.226 Omitted
Region: Northeast  0.148  -0.0820 0.0599  0.173 0.1158 0.1112  0.168 -0.030 0.072
Region: North Central  0.258  -0.0361 0.0530  0.239 0.2217 0.1063  0.243 -0.054 0.058
Region: West  0.386  -0.0393 0.0500  0.372 0.1262 0.0982  0.363 -0.076 0.048
AFQT score  40.324  0.0033 0.0008  33.568 -0.0015 0.0016   36.901 -0.002  0.001
No father present  0.201  0.0978 0.0704  0.272 -0.3333 0.2019  0.251 -0.131 0.106
Father present, not working  0.091  Omitted 0.081 -0.2971 0.2211  0.102 -0.077 0.107
Father's occupation: white collar  0.105  0.1294 0.0789  0.079 -0.0721 0.2348  0.084 0.064 0.123
Father's occupation: pink collar 0.044  0.1860 0.0926  0.034 Omitted  0.043  Omitted
Father's occupation: blue collar 0.559  0.1721 0.0633  0.534 -0.2231 0.1980  0.520 -0.115 0.105
Parents' highest grade  11.054  -0.0063 0.0072  11.017 0.0013 0.0123   11.010 0.007  0.007
Received magazines  0.483  0.0559 0.0373  0.420 -0.0545 0.0700  0.480 -0.006 0.038
Received Papers  0.708  -0.0076 0.0393  0.688 -0.0751 0.0693  0.664 -0.017 0.035
Had a Library Card  0.630  -0.0053 0.0363  0.644 0.0614 0.0682  0.635 -0.074 0.033
Tenure on Previous Job  84.503  0.0001 0.0001  70.766 -0.0005 0.0004   53.830 0.000  0.000
Previous  Occupation:  Professional  0.049 Omitted 0.034 Omitted   0.054 Omitted
Previous Occupation: Managers  0.044  0.0309 0.0918  0.028 0.0232 0.2609  0.020 0.143 0.156
Previous Occupation: Sales  0.029  -0.0612 0.1028  0.020 0.1274 0.2846  0.016 0.041 0.116
Previous Occupation: Clerical  0.059  -0.0266 0.0904  0.042 0.1465 0.2324  0.058 0.118 0.151
Previous Occupation: Craftsmen  0.231  -0.0252 0.0815  0.160 0.0095 0.1975  0.190 0.136 0.140
Previous Occupation: Operatives  0.067  -0.0037 0.0942  0.044 0.0066 0.2264  0.044 0.186 0.138
Previous Occupation: Laborers  0.367  -0.0426 0.0797  0.547 -0.1252 0.1857  0.453 0.113 0.126
Previous Occupation: Farmers  0.022  -0.0101 0.1496  0.017 -0.4352 0.3181  0.033 0.034 0.158
Previous Occupation: Service Workers  0.132  -0.0171 0.0785  0.108 0.0306 0.2082  0.131 0.044 0.137
Previous  Industry:  Agriculture  0.053 Omitted 0.047 Omitted   0.063 Omitted
Previous Industry: Mining  0.015  0.0449 0.1406  0.009 0.0561 0.3257  0.018 -0.073 0.082
Previous Industry: Construction  0.221  0.2208 0.0881  0.285 -0.1827 0.1487  0.217 0.066 0.069
Previous Industry: Manufacturing  0.231  0.1590 0.0883  0.218 -0.0483 0.1489  0.209 0.019 0.068
Prev. Ind.: Transport., Comm., Publ. Util.  0.059  0.0956 0.1006  0.046 0.4486 0.2020  0.051 0.097 0.083
Previous Industry: Wholesale Trade 0.029  0.1485 0.1156  0.020 0.2574 0.2552  0.021 -0.141 0.092
Previous Industry: Retail Trade  0.152  0.1202 0.0929  0.182 -0.0896 0.1599  0.184 0.069 0.067
Previous Industry: Finance, Insurance, RE  0.022  0.0473 0.1238  0.018 0.0614 0.2682  0.014 0.149 0.085
Previous Industry: Business Services 0.095  0.1594 0.0967  0.086 -0.2047 0.1659  0.091 -0.029 0.074
Previous Industry: Personal Services 0.029  0.0391 0.1208  0.025 -0.2999 0.2298  0.022 0.293 0.113
Previous Industry: Entertainment  0.020  0.1402 0.1263  0.015 -0.2611 0.2597  0.019 -0.124 0.134
Previous Industry: Professional Services  0.051  0.2336 0.1032  0.032 -0.0092 0.2342  0.053 0.056 0.096
Previous Industry: Public Administration  0.023  0.0784 0.1311  0.017 -0.2905 0.2331  0.038 -0.031 0.101
Log previous wage  1.665  0.1063 0.0341  1.622 -0.1957 0.0679  1.573 0.400 0.050
Dummy for 1994  - - - - - -
  0.246 -0.063 0.088
Constant  --- - 1.7050 0.5625   - -0.047 0.265
   
Number of observations    5664 2076     1010 
 
                                                           
† Notes: Full set of coefficients and standard errors for the Cox proportional hazards model (Table 5), the search regressions (Table 9), and the reservation wage regressions (Table 10) with the 
aggregate impatience measure. Columns (1), (4), and (7) represent the mean of the relevant explanatory variable in the sample used for the Cox proportional hazards model the search regressions, 
and the reservation wage regressions respectively. 
  
 
Appendix Table 2: Search Intensity Measures 
† 
        
A. Individual Methods      
       Proportion using 
       method 
   State Employment Agency  17.54 
   Private Employment Agency  4.33 
   Direct Contact with Employers   36.63 
   Friends and Relatives  14.23 
   Placed or Answered Ads  8.63 
   Looked at Newspapers  27.66 
   School Employment Service  0.93 
   Other Methods  6.94 
        
B. Number of Methods Used      
     Frequency   Percentage 
   None 1500  42.17 
   1 797  22.41 
   2 686  19.29 
   3 394  11.08 
   4 123  3.46 
   5 37  1.04 
   6 15  0.42 
   7 5  0.14 
   Total 3557  100.00 
        
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Factor Analysis 
†† 
   
  Scoring Coefficient on the 
   Factor Loadings  Uniqueness  Aggregate Measure of Impatience
NLSY Assessment  0.1664 0.9723  0.1038 
Bank Account  0.4537 0.7942  0.3466 
Contraceptive Use  0.3965 0.8428  0.2854 
Life Insurance  0.1461 0.9786  0.0906 
Smoking  0.3471 0.8795  0.2395 
Alcohol  0.1230 0.9849  0.0758 
Vocational Clubs  0.0001 1.0000  0.0001 
 
                                                           
†Notes: Distributions are based on the sample of unemployment spells that began after 1985 for males who were not in school, and that were 
matched to an interview date.  
*: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.1 level. 
**: Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
†† Notes: Factor analysis is used to create an aggregate impatience measure derived from the individual standardized measures of impatience. 
Entries in the table represent maximum likelihood estimates for a factor analysis model with one factor retained. 
 